p 1887] Scientific Fact and Scientific Inference. 793 
-regarded is certainly true. Let us, then, endeavor to find out 
upon what this claim for superiority rests. 
Faltis frequently said that science’s claim for authority is due to 
its dealing only with facts; but plainly this statement is far from’ 
expressing the truth. For, in the first place, all realms of knowl- 
_ edge deal with facts of some sort,—though facts relating to mind 
oer be less cogent than those relating to physical nature,—and, 
in the second place, science is more than a collection of facts. 
A process of collecting and narrating facts is not science, for 
facts have no meaning except as they are compared together, 
and as conclusions are drawn from them. The significance of — 
Science, then, rests upon the deductions from the facts, and not 
_ Upon the facts themselves. We must therefore carefully distin- 
 Suish between scientific facts and scientific inference, and con- 
_ Sider each in turn. 
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3 By scientific facts we mean simple matters of observation, 
Bh i 
Such as that a given stone drops to the ground. In regard to 
Fest upon two things,—Firstly, scientific facts themselves are 
: Such a character that they cannot be modified by man nor 
changed by his imagination. They are beyond the reach of 
influence, and we are forced to accept them as true. 
is cannot be said of the data of other realms of knowl- 
We clearly recognize that minds are unlike, and that 
l € think very differently upon the same subject. Some men 
— deny that there is a right and wrong, or would change the 
Nord right for expediency. When a subject such as metaphysics 
i ‘Upon the introspection of mind alone, it is evident that the 
— factor is a large one. Nothing is, perhaps, more certain 
ue Primary laws of thought, and we must assume that, if 
But DR personal idiosyncrasies, all minds would think alike. 
‘thd E have not yet been able thus to free themselves; 
Ge en it comes to the application of the laws of thought, 
oag difficulty of the application or the personal factor of 
Tor becomes so great that contradictory results are 
tha and the certainty, of course, destroyed. We see from — 
$ -d is open to error, which must be recognized as 
all but the simplest laws of thought. Mental processes, 
' » Mental activities in general, are open to vari- 
