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794 Scientific Fact and Scientific Inference. ; 
ation in different persons; but we are confident that the 
nature are alike for every one, and are therefore more tolt 
trusted than anything open to individual variation. But, 
upon evidence, for there is always the possibility of 
and verification. Upon this consideration rests prima 
confidence in the facts of science; and this, again, is a 
of certainty not possible except in natural science. Hi 
proaches more closely to science in its certainty than 4 
else. A scientific fact is in itself, of course, no more 
a fact of history, in so far as each rests upon the same € 
and the evidence may become sufficient to establish 1 
facts with absolutely convincing force. But we can never 
facts of history; it must depend entirely upon evidence, 
becomes less certain as it becomes less in amount, and 
quently as we get farther away from the facts. Nor can 
be sure of repeating mental conceptions. We 
m 
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mental processes, and therefore repeating his thoug 
far, then, as scientific facts depend upon evide 
same force as facts of history. In sọ far as t 
_ processes in observation, they are open to the same 
personal error as all other mental actions. But 
by repetition be made a perpetual source of evidence 
individual, and when we realize that they are mater 
vation and not of interpretation, and therefore P wi 
syncrasies are almost entirely eliminated, we must 
scientific facts as more certain than all others, and, 
approaching the condition of absolute certainty. 
But this is only the beginning of the matter. 
tented herself with facts her position would bev 
