1895.] Psychology. 691 
ception arise together when new experiences are brought face to face 
with old memories to whose motor tendencies their own can be but 
partially assimilated. In so far as assimilation takes place the concept 
arises ; in so far as it does not the respective contents are discriminated 
as particulars, and this discrimination is the function of perception. 
By the omission of certain motor reactions peculiar to the several 
occurences of a common sensory content the latter is abstracted. Thus 
we see that the general or abstract “is not content at all. It is an 
attitude, an expectation, a motor tendency.” (P.330.) And when 
we recognize an object as belonging to a class, we mean that this 
object presents, in addition to the motor reactions peculiar to itself, 
motor reactions common to it and many other objects. 
SYMPATHY is primarily due to imitation—At times a new pre- 
sentation is assimilated to memories of past experiences and thus 
awakens their emotional reactions—at others the sight of the emotional 
reaction in others provokes a similar reaction directly. To imitation 
the consciousness of self is also largely due. Its earliest form is found 
in a discrimination of persons as moving and especially interesting 
objects whose conduct at first admits of no exact calculation. This is 
the projective stage. The second stage is initiated by imitation of 
these projects; together with other bodily sensations the sense of 
effort then emerges and with it comes the vague consciousness of self 
as a subject. In the third stage the subjective elements thus gained 
are ascribed to the projects and they become ejects or persons like the 
subject. (Pp. 333 et seqq.) 
Tue Erxtcar FEELING originated in like manner—The child must 
accommodate himself to his environment, and especially to that part 
of his environment which we term the authority of others. But, 
as we have shown, one element of the self owes its origin to this very 
factor. Thus the intrinsic or habitual self tends to come in conflict 
with the self of accommodation and imitation. Later, from this 
external factor, is formed a “ moral ideal of a possible, perfect, regular 
will taken over in me in which the personal and social self—my habits 
and my social calls—are brought completely into harmony ; the sense 
of obligation in me in each case is a sense of lack of harmony—a 
sense of actual discrepencies in the various thoughts of self as my 
actions and tendencies give rise to others.” (P. 345.) 
The third form of imitation, which we may term plastic imitation, 
embraces those degenerated forms of reaction, which, having once 
been conscious, are now become secondarily automatic and subcon- 
scious. They fall under two classes; those that represent habitual 
