950 The American Naturalist. [October, 
our more remote past in some fashion at present incomprehensible, and 
there emerges that intangible, contentless power which, like the rudder 
on a ship, avails to hold us steadily to the course already: planned, and 
makes our present and future symmetrical with our past. Thisis what 
we term “ will” in the narrowest sense, and it is a nompatatively rare 
phenomenon in the experience of most of us. 
If we turn from such an analysis to the problem of volition in the 
lower animals, we find it much simplified. There can be no doubt that 
in the higher vertebrates, at least, the idea trains, however rudimen- 
tary, control conduct to some degree. Yet the part played by the 
reflexes and instincts is so much greater in them than in us, and idea- 
tion is so scanty that the sphere of the voluntary is much restricted. 
Cases of conflict, in which the ideal control overcomes the solicitations 
of sense, are probably of rare occurrence. I noted, a case not long ago, 
however, which seems here in point. A friend of mine had a very intel- 
ligent Irish terrier, who, having been bred to thrifty habits, knew 
better than to eat a scrap of food which had “ cost money ” until it had 
been “paid for.” In the agonizing interval I have sci adh! seen 
him resort to what seemed to be expedients to e temptation 
He seemed to feel that the bit of meat exerted a ‘specific attractive force 
upon his organized reflexes, that he could not help snapping at it if he 
allowed himself to look. He would dance about near it, carefully 
keeping his head twisted to one side, so as to keep the tempting morsel 
out of sight; sometimes, if the words “ It’s paid for, Patsy,” were long 
delayed, he would run to the farthest corner of the room and stay 
there until he heard them. Then he would dart for the food so hastily 
that he sometimes fell in turning towards it, showing that he had had it 
in mind all along. It would seem that this dog, at least, was able to 
exert some direct ideational control over his reflexes, and was suffi- 
ciently intelligent to use suitable means to support that control when 
it was about to fail. 
For the existence of the highest form of will in the lower animals, 
we have no direct evidence, and it is difficult to see how we ever can 
have any. In ourselves it is rare and elusive; it is known by intro- 
spection only, and can not be inferred in another by any external 
signs. The very fact that it is so unusual in us, and that it appears to 
be characteristic of the more highly evolved types of the human mind, 
raises a strong presumption against its existence in the lower minds. 
The word “ rational ” has had a history very like that of “ voluntary ”. 
In its simplest sense it designates conduct controlled by a more distant 
end; it is thus opposed to the impulsive conduct which seeks the pres- 
