52 LAWS APPLICABLE TO THE NATIONAL FORESTS. 



Contest and protest. 



In this case there is no individual adverse claimant, but the Gov- 

 ernment, by its Chief Executive, has claimed the land within the 

 boundaries of said reservation for a specific public purpose (i. e., a 

 forest reservation) , excepting only the lands coming within the above 

 category; and the Executive order, reserving the land for a specific 

 public purpose must be held to be at least as effective upon the claims 

 of settlers as would be the adverse claim of one who wished the land 

 for his own use. Held, therefore, that a settler who failed to file his 

 application for entry within three months after the plat of survey 

 was filed in the local land office, was precluded from making entry in 

 the presence of an intervening forestry withdrawal. (Joshua L. 

 Smith, 31 L. D., 57; see also Hattie E. Bradley, 34 L. D., 191, 193, 

 and Esther F. Filer, 36 L. D., 360, 363.) 



A decision by the Secretary of the Interior that a telegram and 

 letter from a special agent of the General Land Office, alleging fraud 

 in a number of commuted entries and suggesting delay in issuing 

 patents pending further examination, constitutes a " protest " in the 

 meaning of the act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 1099), requiring issu- 

 ance of patent within two years after final receipt when no " contest 

 or protest is pending," is not reviewable on an application for a writ 

 of mandamus. (Fisher v. United States ex rel., Grand Rapids 

 Timber Co. (Ct. of Appeals D. C), 40 L. D., 278; see also Jacob A. 

 Harris, 42 L. D., 611.) 



Section 2 of the act of March 3, 1911 (36 Stat, 1084), validating 

 certain homestead entries in national forests applies to all contests 

 initiated under the act of May 14, 1880, prior to the forestry with- 

 drawal, where cancellation of the entry results therefrom, regardless 

 of whether the cancellation was procured prior or subsequent to the 

 withdrawal. (Sante Fe Pacific R. R. Co., 39 L. D., 611.) 



Miscellaneous. 



The excepting clause of the Olympic National Forest proclamation 

 ceases to apply in behalf of a settler who fails to make entry or filing 

 for the lands within the time allowed by law. (Arnold Wink, 31 

 L. D., 47.) 



On the relinquishment of a homestead entry within the San Fran- 

 cisco Mountains Forest Reserve, the lands become a part of the forest 

 reserve and are not open to subsequent entry. (E. S. Gosney, 29 

 L. D., 44.) 



Where a homestead entryman was in default at the time of reserva- 

 tion of the lands for forest purposes, he can not thereafter cure the 

 default in the face of the reservation. (Svan Hoglund, 43 L. D., 538.) 



Commutation of a homestead entry included within a forest reser- 

 vation can not be allowed unless it be shown that at the date of the 

 reservation the homestead law was being complied with by the entry- 

 man. (Id.) 



By the excepting clause in the proclamation of May 6, 1905, creat- 

 ing the Klamath Forest Reserve, it was intended to except from the 

 reservation those legal entries upon which the entrymen were at that 

 time complying with the law and continued to comply with the law 

 after the reservation was made. (Id.) 



