GENEKAL ADMINISTRATION. 13 



constitutional power in conferring power on the Secretary to estab- 

 lish such rules ; the power so conferred being administrative and not 

 legislative, is not an unconstitutional delegation. 



While it is difficult to define the line which separates legislative 

 power to make laws and administrative authority to make regula- 

 tions, Congress may delegate power to fill up details where it has 

 indicated its will in the statute, and it may make violations of such 

 regulations punishable as indicated in the statute ; and so held that 

 regulations made by the Secretary of Agriculture as to grazing sheep 

 on forest reserves have the force of law and that violations thereof 

 are punishable under act of June 4, 1897, chapter 2 (30 Stat., 35), as 

 prescribed in section 5388, Revised Statutes. 



Congress can not delegate legislative power (Field v. Clark, 143 

 U. S., 692), but the authority to make administrative rules is not a 

 delegation of legislative power, and such rules do not become legis- 

 lation because violations thereof are punished as public offenses. 



Even if there is no express act of Congress making it unlawful to 

 graze sheep or cattle on a forest reserve, when Congress expressly 

 provides that such reserves can only be used for lawful purposes sub- 

 ject to regulations and makes a violation of such regulations an 

 offense, any existing implied license to graze is curtailed and quali- 

 fied by Congress; and one violating the regulations when promul- 

 gated makes an unlawful use of the Government's property and be- 

 comes subject to the penalty imposed. 



A provision in an act of Congress as to the use made of moneys 

 received from Government property clearly indicates an authority to 

 the executive officer authorized by statute to make regulations regard- 

 ing the property to impose a charge for its use. 



Where the penalty for violations of regulations to be made by an 

 executive officer is prescribed by statute, the violation is not made a 

 crime by such officer, but by Congress, and Congress and not such 

 officer fixes the penalty, nor is the offense against such officer, but 

 against the United States. (Same.) 



Light v. United States, 220 U. S., 523 (syllabus). 



Congress may authorize an executive officer to make rules and reg- 

 ulations as to the use, occupancy, and preservation of forests, and 

 such authority so granted is not unconstitutional as a delegation of 

 legislative power. (Following United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S., 

 506.) 



At common law the owner was responsible for damage done by his 

 live stock on land of third parties, but the United States has tacitly 

 suffered its public domain to be used for cattle so long as such tacit 

 consent was not canceled, but no vested rights have been conferred on 

 any person, nor has the United States been deprived of the power of 

 recalling such implied license. 



While the full scope of section 3, Article IV, of the Constitution 

 has never been definitely settled, it is primarily a grant of power to 

 the United States of control over its property (Kansas v t Colorado, 

 206 U. S., 89) ; this control is exercised by Congress to the same 

 extent that an individual can control his property. 



It is for Congress and not for the courts to determine how the 

 public lands shall be administered. 



