LANDS TIMBER AND STONE. 71 



The entire management of these entries was in the hands of an 

 agent of the Martin-Alexander Co. It furnished the moneys both 

 for the purchase prices and all expenses, and it is not easy to believe 

 that it did all this on a mere expectation that after the entries had 

 been made it would purchase the timber. It is a much more reason- 

 able conclusion that it had an understanding with the parties making 

 the entries respecting purchases and prices. * * * We agree 

 with the Court of Appeals that the testimony points strongly to the 

 fact that the entries were in pursuance of an understanding or agree- 

 ment with the Martin- Alexander Co. that, as it was advancing all 

 the money, the entryman should convey to it the standing timber at 

 a fixed price. (United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S., 321.) 



The act does not in any respect limit the domain which the pur- 

 chaser has over the land after it is purchased from the Government, 

 or restrict, in the slightest, his power of alienation. All that it 

 denounces is a prior agreement, the acting for another in the pur- 

 chase. If, when the title passed from the Government, no one save 

 the purchaser has any claim for it, the act is satisfied. Montgomery 

 might rightfully come or send into that vicinity and make known 

 generally or to individuals a willingness to buy timberland at a price 

 in excess of that which it would cost to obtain it from the Govern- 

 ment, and any person knowing of that offer might rightfully come to 

 the land office and make application and purchase a timber tract from 

 the Government. (United States v. Budd, 144 U. S., 154.) 



A person desiring to purchase a large tract of timberlands of the 

 United States may lawfully express such desire to another, and con- 

 tract with him to purchase the lands and advance money to enable the 

 seller to acquire the land from the entryman, and he is not bound to 

 inquire into the method by which such seller acquires the title, nor 

 chargeable with any fraud therein which would render the patent 

 subject to cancellation, of which he has no actual knowledge. (U. S. 

 v, Barber Lumber Co. (C. C. A.), 194 Fed., 24.) 



To warrant the cancellation of a patent for lands on account of 

 fraud, the evidence must be clear, unequivocal, and convincing, and 

 it can not be done on a bare preponderance of evidence which leaves 

 the issue in doubt. (Idem.) 



Application under the timber and stone act (sworn statement) 

 must be based on a personal examination of the land and not made 

 on information and belief or by agent. (Ness v. Fisher, 223 U. S., 

 683; see also case of Frank L. Chambers et al., 40 L. D., 85.) 



Section 1 of the act of March 3, 1911, authorizing the reinstate- 

 ment of homestead entries canceled or relinquished because of the 

 erroneous allowance of such entries after the withdrawal of lands 

 for national forest purposes makes no provision for the reinstatement 

 of canceled timber and stone entries. (Albert L. Knight, 41 L. D., 

 261.) 



Where the smallest legal subdivision embraced in a timber and 

 stone entry contains but little timber, and is chiefly valuable because 

 it is the site of, and controls access to, a spring, such legal subdivision 

 should be eliminated from the entry. (Ada B. Millican, 43 L. D., 553.) 



