114 LAWS APPLICABLE TO THE NATIONAL FORESTS. 



trover will lie for its conversion (Sampson v. Hammond, supra; 

 White v. Yawkey, 108 Ala., 270, 275) ; (3) the value of the property 

 when first taken is the measure of damages recoverable (Wooden- 

 ware case, 106 U. S., 432, 434) ; and (4) the value of the property 

 when first taken, within the meaning of the Woodenware case, is its 

 value immediately when it takes the form of personal property — 

 i. e., immediately after severance from the freehold (White v. Yaw- 

 key, 108 Ala., 270, 274, 275)." 



In Pine River Logging Co. v. United States (186 U. S., 279, 293) 

 the doctrine of the Woodenware case as to willful trespasses is stated 

 to be that " if the trespass be willfully committed the trespasser can 

 obtain no credit for the labor expended upon it, and is liable for its 

 full value when seized " ; and this rule was applied in the case under 

 consideration, the parties in the possession of the timber at that time 

 being found to have participated in the trespass. 



Where timber is cut upon public land by one who knows that the 

 land belongs to the Government, or who has no reasonable ground to 

 believe that it belongs to himself or to some one under whom he 

 claims, the trespass is a willful one. (Bly v. United States, Fed. 

 case No. 1581, 4 Dill., 464.) 



In actions of trespass where the injury has been wanton and mali- 

 cious or gross and outrageous, courts permit juries to add to the 

 measured compensation of the plaintiff, which he would have been 

 entitled to recover had the injury been inflicted without design or 

 intention, something further by way of punishment or example, 

 which has sometimes been called " smart money." (Day v. Wood- 

 worth, 13 How., 362, 371; see also Barry v. Edmunds, 116U. S., 550.) 



Where the defendant admits the cutting and removal of timber 

 from public lands, the Government is entitled to at least nominal 

 damages, in the absence of direct evidence of the value of the stand- 

 ing trees. (United States v. Mock, 149 U. S., 273 ; see also United 

 States v. Taylor, 35 Fed., 484.) 



In trover for crude turpentine unlawfully but not willfully taken 

 from pine trees, the measure of damages is its value at the time of 

 conversion with interest. (Quitman Naval Stores Co. v. Conway, 

 58 So. Rep., 840; Solicitor to his assistant at Albuquerque, Dec. 

 26, 1912.) 



Where, in an action for timber trespass, the jury found from the 

 evidence that defendants had taken logs from public lands, but the 

 number taken was uncertain, they were entitled to indulge every 

 reasonable inference supported by the evidence in determining the 

 number. (United States v. McCaskill, 200 Fed., 332.) 



Fire trespasses. 



In United States v. Henry Clay (unreported), Southern District 

 of California, the defendant was indicted under section 52 of the 

 Criminal Code, and the jury were charged by Judge Wellborn in 

 part as follows: 



" It is immaterial whether the fire * * * originated on private 

 land if it was set wilfully and if in the course of nature and in view 

 of all the surroundings the said fire would reasonably be expected to 

 be communicated to the public domain. A man has no lawful right 

 to set fire to his own property if he has reason to believe or intends 



