TRESPASSES DECISIONS. 117 



Where cattle are turned loose under circumstances showing that the 

 owner expects and intends that they shall go upon a reserve to graze 

 thereon, for which he has no permit and he declines to apply for one, 

 and threatens to resist efforts to have the cattle removed and contends 

 that he has a right to have his cattle go on the reservation, equity has 

 jurisdiction, and such owner can be enjoined at the instance of the 

 Government, whether the land has been fenced or not. (Id.) 



Injunctions to restrain grazing trespassers. 



[Shannon v. United States (C. C. A. Ninth Circuit), 160 Fed., 870.] 



Where defendant drove large bands of cattle into a 320-acre pasture 

 which was inclosed on three sides, but open on the side toward a 

 public forest reserve, knowing that there was no water in the pasture, 

 and that it was insufficient to sustain the cattle, and that they must of 

 necessity drift onto the reserve for pasture and water, defendant 

 could not claim freedom from responsibility for the cattle trespassing 

 on the reserve because he at no time drove them there and because the 

 reserve was not inclosed. 



The creation of a forest reserve severs the reserved land from the 

 public domain and appropriates it to public use, so that it is no longer 

 subject to the implied license to pasture on public lands. 



The rules promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior regulating 

 the number of cattle and other live stock that may be pastured on a 

 forest reserve, and the manner in which the owners may obtain per- 

 mission to use the reservation for that purpose, are reasonable and 

 within the power granted by act of Congress of June 4, 1897, chapter 

 2 (30 Stat., 34 U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1542) , giving the Secretary of 

 the Interior power to make rules and regulations and establish such 

 service as will insure the objects of such reservations, namely, to 

 regulate their occupancy and use and to preserve the forests from 

 destruction. 



The Federal Constitution delegates to Congress the general power, 

 absolutely and without limitation, to dispose of and make all needful 

 rules and regulations concerning the public domain independent of 

 the locality of the land, whether situated in a State or Territory, the 

 exercise of which power can not be restricted in any degree by State 

 legislation. 



Congress had no power to relinquish any of its jurisdiction over 

 the public domain by a compact with the State of Montana on 

 admission of the State into the Union, nor had the State any power 

 to reserve any such control. 



Public lands in the State of Montana were not subject to the stock 

 and fence laws of the State, which were applicable only to lands 

 subject to the State's dominion. 



Where the United States brought suit to restrain the trespass of 

 defendant's cattle on a forest reserve, the fact that in such suit it 

 acted in its proprietary capacity and was subject to the ordinary rules 

 of pleading, practice, and laws applicable to the case did not operate 

 as a waiver of any of its sovereign rights to the land sought to be 

 protected. 



It was no defense to an injunction restraining defendant's use of a 

 United States forest reserve as a pasture that its issuance would 

 impose a grievous burden on him to restrain the cattle in his adjoin- 



