Psychology. 267 
acting upon mind—that to escape this dead-lock in the way of a 
unitary or monistic conception of nature, a theory of cognition is 
indispensable. 
y help of such a theory we become irrefragably aware that 
matter and motion are only perceptual signs within our own con- 
sciousness of the presence of a non-mental existent and its activity, 
which are stimulating our senses in specific ways. We can be cer- 
tain that what thus effects our senses. is really non-mental in its 
nature; for nothing mental has power to affect our senses and to 
awaken specific percepts in us. This non-mental existent and its 
activity cannot possibly, in the remotest degree, resemble their per- 
ceptual representation in us; for how can anything non-menta 
resemble anything mental? Therefore, they are not in themselves 
what we perceptually know as matter and motion. And thus the 
conception of mind moving matter becomes at once irrelevant. The 
dualistic opposition of matter and mind is seen to be superficial, 
and only due to inadequte conception on our part. 
These truths, yielded by the theory of cognition, I have used to 
explain our voluntary movements, upon which movements the 
— question of the influence of our “ mind ” on our body actually 
centers. 
_ Our veritable being has power so to affect the sensibility of an 
observer as to arouse its perceptual representation in him. This 
tr arm of the observer, in all its details, forms clearly part of 
18 Own consciousness; but it representatively corresponds to the 
characteristics of the non-mental existent, which is stimulating his 
sen 
ses, 
Now, it is evidently the transient activity or function of that part 
of the permanent living being which we perceive as his nerve-system 
that yields to him all his conscious states. 
While this functional play of inner awareness is taking place in 
the observed organism, the observer himself perceives nothing but 
motion; motion of molecules in the nerve-system, and dependent 
movements of peripheral parts of the organism, such as features 
and limbs. 
“Mind” or consciousness is thus a functional outcome of the 
organization of living beings, and its development is found to keep 
strict pace with the progressive organization of living forms.— 
Edmund Montgomery.— From Open Court, Chicago, March 1, 1888. 
Tue Rep Fox ar Scnoor.—Nearing Ashland, Wisconsin, one 
May day, an Indian lad boarded the train with a basket, in which 
were three little red foxes (Vulpes rufus), their eyes just open, a 
ome as little fairies. He expected a bounty for their scalps, 
actly sold one little fellow to me. Too young to know what 
a ed was,—only as an inherited instinct, I determined to see how 
T he would yield to kind treatment and general domestication. 
