952 The Relations of Mind and Matter. [October, 
increases as we ascend in the animal scale. And what was once 
conscious condition falls steadily back into the realm of the un- 
conscious, as higher stages of this activity arise. Yet even in 
lower man consciousness is dull in action and limited in range as 
compared with civilized man. Customary actions and thoughts 
tend to lose all sharpness of conscious definition, and the cus- 
tomary rules far more supremely in lower men and in the brute 
realm than in the world of civilization. 
By this dulling of customary sensations consciousness is con- 
~  Stantly set free for superior labors. It is actively exerted in get- 
ting a firm grasp on every new condition presented to it. But 
this once gained, attention is set free and reaches outward and 
upward. The new acquisition sinks deep into the mind, to be 
recalled at intervals, and perhaps in time to become a constituent 
part of the mental constitution. In the case of the child learning 
to walk, for instance, consciousness is vividly concentrated upon 
its efforts. But the movement once gained the attention is set 
free for devotion to other things, and the motion of walking may 
finally be performed unconsciously. Numerous other instances 
of this kind might be adduced, leading up to that often quoted 
and extraordinary one of the nearly or quite unconscious action 
of the fingers of the pianist. 
In regard to mental labors the same rule applies. We are con- 
stantly exercised in observing new facts, imagining new condi- 
tions, forming new ideas, Each addition to our mental stores 
occupies the consciousness more or less exclusively until it be- 
comes an habitual occupant of the mind, after which the attention 
is released for devotion to new labors, and the idea thus gained 
sinks back into the fabric of the mind: It may be recalled at will, 
but it no longer has a despotic control of the consciousness. In 
this upward progress of the mind we are often inclined to believe 
that the superiority of higher man is intellectual only, and that 
n regard to acuteness of the senses he has fallen behind the sav- 
age. Yet this is not the case. He may have lost acuteness in 
respect to distant vision, or sharpness of hearing, but his sensi- 
=~ tiveness has grown far more diversified. He can see countless 
delicate shades of color and variations of form, can appreciate the 
most minute variations of musical tone, can distinguish delicate 
s of odor and taste of gece the savage is utterly incapa- 
‘aad senses have y thus becom more delicate and 
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