96 Proceedings of the Asiatic Society. [June, 



At the present time all viclitiras are of this kind, — not to elucidate 

 the real meaning (for this is accepted on the authority of the writer), 

 but to endeavour to establish or overthrow some verbal quibble 

 which seeks to impugn the perfect accuracy of the definition. 



In the teaching of the Pandits everything is directed to one end, 

 ad bene disputandum. The primeval fault of the Hindu intellect 

 has always been an excessive tendency to note the differences of 

 things ;* and of course such teaching in logic and law only fosters 

 this defect to the highest possible degree. 



As a specimen, I would subjoin a disquisition on the nature of 

 prohibition given by Pandit Brajamith Vidyaratna, the leading 

 teacher of Smriti. 



A student was selected during my visit to his tole to read and 

 explain a portion of one of Raghunandana's Tattwas. The passage 

 brought up the question of prohibition or Nishedha, and this led to 

 the Pandit's giving a lecture on its nature and object. 



I must here premise that in Hindu logic there are three kinds of 

 abhava, i. e., non-existence or absence.f These are respectively 

 called "antecedent" (pragabhava)," emergent" (dhwansabhava) and 

 "absolute" (atyantabhava). The first is the non-existence of a jar 

 before it is made, which lasts from eternity down to the moment of 

 its production and then ceases. The second is the non-existence of 

 a jar when it is broken, which begins from the moment of its 

 fracture and goes on to eternity forward. The third or absolute non- 

 existence is seen in such sentences, as " there is no jar on this spot ;" 

 even if you move the jar thereto, there will be no jar in its 

 former spot. The non-existence is always seen necessarily someivliere, 

 else the jar would be omnipresent. 



Now the Pandit maintained that the object of " command" (or vidlii) 

 was to produce action or activity (pravritti) ; and similarly the object 



* This tendency was at once the strength and weakness of the self-developed 

 Hindu mind. Compare Novum Orgcmon, i. iv. " Maximum et velut radiculo 

 difloriman ingeniorum, quoad philosophiara et scientias, illud est ; quod alia 

 ingenia sunt potiora et aptiora ad notandas rerum differentias, alia ad notandas 

 niiim similitudines. Utrumquo ingenium facile labitur in excessum, prensando 

 ant grados rerum aut ttmbraa." 



f Properly there arc four, but the fourth (mutual or inter-exclusive non- 

 existence) does not come inhere. This is in fact our 'difference ;' thus a jar 

 and a chair mutually exclude one another, i, c, they are different things. 



