BIOLOGY IN OUR ARTS CURRICULUM. 109 
is enough that we know that certain means have a tendency to 
produce a certain effect, and that others have a tendency to 
frustrate it.’* If this is the amount of knowledge required to 
form a science, then certainly there is a science of history. 
Much as I admire Professor Jevons’ “ Principles of Science,” 
I must object to this one sentence—“ A science of history, in the 
true sense of the term, is an absurd notion.” I object to it because 
by many people it will be taken to imply that a science of 
history isimpossible. Such, however, is not, I think, the meaning 
of Professor Jevons, because he continues as follows :—‘ A nation 
is not a mere sum of individuals whom we can treat by the method 
of averages; it is an organic whole, held together by ties of 
infinite complexity. Each individual acts and reacts upon his 
own smaller or greater circle of friends ; and those who acquire 
a public position exert an influence on much larger sections of 
the nation. There will always be a few great leaders of 
exceptional genius or opportunities, the unaccountable phases of 
whose opinions and inclinations sway the whole body, even when 
they are least aware of it. From time to time arise critical 
positions, battles, delicate negotiations, internal disturbances, in 
which the slightest incidents may profoundly change the course 
of history. A rainy day may hinder a forced march, and change 
_the course of a campaign; a few injudicious words in a dispatch 
may irritate the national pride; the accidental discharge of a 
gun may precipitate a collision, the effects of which may last for 
centuries. It is said that the history of Europe at one moment 
depended upon the question whether the look-out man on 
Nelson’s vessel would or would not descry a ship of Napoleon’s 
expedition to Egypt which was passing not far off. In human 
affairs then, the smallest effects may produce the greatest results; 
and in such circumstances the real application of scientific 
methods is out of the question.” 
I have given this long quotation because I wish you to have 
the case fairly put before you. From it I gather that Professor 
Jevons’ words are directed against the application to history of 
the doctrine of averages as advocated by Buckle, and he means, 
I think, that human affairs are too complicated to allow of 
results being often predicted ; but this, as I have already said, 
is very different fron denying the possibility of a science of 
history. If I throw a glass bottle on the ground, I can safely 
predict that it will be broken ; but, notwithstanding the perfec- 
tion of the science of mechanics, no man can predict into how 
many pieces it will be broken. And the same with history: we 
may safely predict that the Turk will not rule long in Europe, 
although it is impossible to predict in detail the events which 
will turn him out. Asa case of a verified prediction in history, 
I may remind you that at the commencement of the campaign 
of 1806 between France and Prussia, Jomini predicted that a 
decisive battle would be fought in the neighbourhood of Jena, 
* «System of Logic,” 
