HUMANISM AND REALISM. 555 
is generally taught as a secondary matter ; it gets the crumbs 
from the rich man’s table, and, therefore, even good and con- 
scientious masters who have to teach it look very often upon it 
as a mere appendage to their more important work, and I con- 
sequently fully endorse the author’s observations, that “when 
scientific physics have as recognised a place in public instruction 
as Latin and Greek, they will be as well taught.” Again, when 
speaking of the present mode of examination for matriculation in 
England, he wishes it so altered that the examiners should become 
acquainted with the whole amount of culture the candidate has 
received. He dwells emphatically upon the fact that the Ger- 
man authorities consider the bare examination test quite in- 
sufficient, and, he continues, “so averse are they to cram, so 
clearly do they perceive that what forms a youth, and what he 
should in all ways be induced to acquire, is the orderly develop- 
ment of his faculties under good and trained teaching. With 
this view all the instructions are drawn up. It is to tempt 
candidates to no special preparation and effort, but to be such 
as a scholar of fair ability and proper diligence may at the end 
of his school course come to with a quiet mind, and without a 
painful preparatory effort, tending to relaxation and torpor as 
soon as the effort is over” (page 59). In offering his views for 
remedying the evil effect of the present system, he sums up as 
follows (page 191) :—‘“ The ideal of a general liberal training 
is, to carry us to a knowledge of ourselves and the world. We 
are called to this knowledge by special aptitudes which are 
born with us; the grand thing in teaching is to have faith 
that some aptitudes of this kind everyone has. This one’s 
special aptitudes are for knowing men—the study of the 
humanities; that one’s special aptitudes are for knowing the 
world—the study of nature. The circle of knowledge com- 
prehends both, and we should all have some notion at any 
rate of the whole circle of knowledge. The rejection of the 
humanities by the realists, the rejection of the study of nature 
by the humanists, are alike ignorant. He whose aptitudes 
carry him to the study of nature should have some notion of 
the humanities; he whose aptitudes carry him to the hu- 
manities should have some notion of the phenomena and laws 
of nature. Evidently, therefore, the beginnings of a liberal 
culture should be the same for both. The mother tongue, 
the elements of Latin and of the chief modern languages, the 
elements of history, of arithmetic and geometry, of geography, 
and of the knowledge of nature, should be the studies of the 
lower classes in the secondary schools, and should be the 
same for all boys at this stage. So far, therefore, there is no 
reason for a division of schools. But then comes a bifurca- 
tion, according to the boys’ aptitudes and aims. Either the 
study of the humanities or the study of nature is henceforth 
to be the predominating part of his instruction.’ From this 
passage it will be seen that our author advocates a bifurca- 
tion of the secondary schools, a humanistic and realistic side, 
