KUNGL. SV. VET. AKADEMIENS HANDLINGAR. BAND 57. N:G 4. 71 



adds that "those who have undertaken that voyage and have made it declare that both 

 these islands are very well suited to be places for refitting for the ships from the Philippines, 

 and that it would be advantageous to find them again and colonize one of them for this 

 purpose". The execution of the plan was to be carried out in this way: Vizcaino, as 

 captain of the galleon, was to embark at Acapulco, and, after his arrival at Manila, take 

 över the command of two small and lightly-laden ships equipped for no other purpose 

 than discovery. After this discovery had been made, as they hoped, on the return voyage 

 to New Spain, Vizcaino was to sail for the Philippines in the following year and then, 

 with the trading ships, begin the equipment of a station on the islands sought for. 1 



This plan was approved by the King on 27 September 1608; but the very next year 

 it was altered at the instance of de los Rios, in that it was determined that as a starting- 

 point for the expedition Acapulco should be changed for Manila. Nor was this to settle 

 the question: it was not until after extensive discussions, in which de los Rios still took 

 an active part, that they returned to the first proposal that Vizcaino should start from 

 Acapulco. That the plan was thought to deserve carrying out at all, was probably due to 

 the detailed intelligence about the position of the islands that de los Rios brought for- 

 ward during these discussions: he asserted that they lay at a distance of 150 leagues from 

 Japan, Rica de Oro in 29° and Rica de Platå in 36°, and that he himself had seen them in 

 the course of a voyage from the Philippines 2 — ■ an assertion that can only be due to an 

 illusion or to a lively imagination which confused his own observation with hearsay from 

 others. The decision as to the starting-point, again, was certainly dictated by the fact 

 that in October 1610 some twenty Japanese had arrived at Acapulco with Don Rodrigo 

 de Vivero y Velasco, 3 and that they could take their conveyance back to their native 

 country as a pretext for the expedition, whose real object could thus be kept secret from 

 the Japanese authorities. With the plan of going direct to Japan for this purpose, without 

 calling at the Philippines, was also associated the decision of sending letters and presents 

 to the Shogun, in order to persuade him to grant commercial privileges to the Spaniards 

 in his country and to allow them to investigate the harbours on the east and south coast 

 of Japan, where the galleons might be compelled to seek refuge. 



After all these preparations Sebastian Vizcaino was at length able to set sail from 

 Acapulco on 22 March 1611. He did not depart far from the usual highway, but steered 

 west in 12° lat.; and not till he had sailed 1400 leagues in this direction and thought that 

 he was in the neighbourhood of the Ladrones, was the course altered to NW. in order 

 to reach the latitude of Japan. They now encountered severe storms, which strained the 

 ship and the seamen to the uttermost. The narra ti ve of the voyage 4 says: "In this way 

 the voyage was continued against wind and current, which were so violent that they took 

 it for granted that they would never be able to reach the Japanese coast; it blew con- 

 tinually from the south-west off the point of the country. They thus feared that they 

 would be compelled to put in on the coast of Great Tartary or Korea." "This agrees 



1 See Bl. & Rob. XIV, pp. 270—277. 



2 Cf. Nachod, op. cit., p. 340. 



3 Concerning this voyage see p. 80 below. 



4 Printed in Colecciön de documcntos ined. del Archivo de Indias, Vill, 1867, pp. 101 — 199. 



