“ 
84 General Notes. [ January, 
between reminiscence and recognition is this. In reminiscence 
the peculiar form of consciousness is actually reproduced, accord- 
ing to the law of associated ideas ; in recognition the recurrence 
of the original stimulus is necessary to arouse memory ; other- 
wise the sensation would not return to consciousness. The for- 
mer is evidently the stronger and truer form of memory, and as it 
answers our purpose best, and is most easily examined, I confine 
my attention to it for. the present. 
This much being understood, it appears to me that the follow- 
ing propositions may be maintained :- 
at objective impressions are less profound than subjective, 
the capacity for reminiscence being the index. 
II. That of the objective, those introduced by the special sen- 
.ses are more profound than those introduced by the general 
senses. 
III. That of the former, those introduced by supposed vibra- 
tions (sound, sight) are more profound than those produced by 
supposed contact of matter (taste, smell). 
IV. That of subjective impressions, those produced by acts of 
intelligence are more readily and exactly reproduced, than are 
those produced by the emotions. 
These propositions might be illustrated at great length, but for 
the present I content myself with the following: 
II. The pleasures and pains of general sensation cannot be re- 
produced by an act of memory. No one can reproduce any par- 
ticular pain for instance. It is probable that pleasures and pains 
which are characteristic (locality being left out of account), can be 
more or less recognized on their recurrence, showing that they 
make a real, but comparatively slight impression on the physical 
basis ofconsciousness. 
the reproduction is very imperfect; and although the reproduc- 
tion of visible objects is, in most people, more distinct, it is short 
of the reality of seeing. ` 
IV. Mnemonic reproduction of an emotion is not difficult, but 
falls short of the emotion itself, even in the most pronounced 
cases. Although emotions leave behind them deep impressions, 
they are plainly evanescent, in some persons more so than in 
others. Nevertheless a reproduced emotion is more distinctly like 
the original than is a reproduced sight. 
Of processes of the intelligence, those of the imagination are 
` reproduced with great precision and clearness in most persons, 
but not more so than processes of reason. It is only in the intel- 
ligence that it is safe to say that the reproduction or reminiscence 
is identical with its original. It is true that the impression may 
be evanescent here also, but it is less so than in the case of am 
