9) REMARKS ON THE 
And thus it is that 
we call figs. A’A” A” a_series of proportionals metamor- 
as product of a law, must be correct. 
phosed from an archetype which we find still standing in 
thoracic series, under which interpretation we include figs. 
B’B’B” also. 
Hitherto we have compared one figure with another 
separate figure in the same serial order, and we have seen 
that these were the proportionals of an archetype common 
quantity. But now we compare the same ens with itself, 
and discover it to be proportionally various to itself. Thus 
figs. A’ A” A” are several conditions of the seventh cervical 
vertebra, and figs. B’B”B” represent several varieties or 
proportional quantities of the first lumbar vertebra. 
‘With these facts before us, we shall briefly consider the 
several views of the three departments of anatomical science, 
in so far as the subject of osteology concerns them separ- 
ately, and we shall imquire of each, to what result they 
promise to lead onwards from what we already know. 
Special anatomy gives the name vertebra to fig. A’ and 
B’ of the cervix and loins. Vesalius has called these 
continues to call them by 
Vesalius would have named 
quantities vertebrae, and 
-the same name to this hour. 
figs. A” and A” the anomalies of fig. A’; and so does —— 
to this very day push blindly against figs. A” A” as though 
they were obstructions met with in the dark. Thus special 
anatomy remains sti]l in that condition in which it found 
itself when it first begun, certain of no failure, because 
rising to no effort. 
Now, comparative anatomy pursuing the differential 
method in the vain and useless quest of the line which 
separates special varieties, continues also to know fig. A’ 
as a vertebra the seventh quantity of the mammalian | 
cervix, and because it wishes to read it as a law invariable 
that the cervical region of the mammal spine should (for 
its own sake) never overstep this set rule of a@ cervical 
region of seven vertebre, so, even when it does transgress 
and make exception to the stated rule, why then “the 
exception does but prove the rule,” and so the rule endures. 
But does this rule endure in nature? Are there not ex- 
ceptions, many and various, in an animal kingdom? 
Many even in the class mammalia? 
Many even in any and every species? 
Nay, more, is it not the fact that the transition region 
Many even in the 
human species ? 
between the mammalian cervix and thorax is as much 
liable to overturn the cramping rules of nomenclature as 
the transition region between the mammal thorax and 
loins? Still, by the differential method, comparative 
anatomy draws the arbitrary lime of special distinction 
FIGURES OF PLATE 
XIX, 
between Mammals as a class and that of Aves, of Reptilia 
and of Pisces, for as much as fig. A’, the seventh vertebra - 
of the mammal cervix, is at least said to terminate this 
region, which is then immediately suecceded by the thoracic 
series. If this be the fact, whence comes the seventh 
cervical form of fig. A” or A’, which not only interrupts 
the rule of classes but even the rule of species? Is it not 
plain that the same crude method by which the human 
anatomist distinguishes the seventh cervical vertebra from 
the first thoracic form (heedless of the proportional series 
of figs. AYA” A” with which he may fill up hiatus) still 
guides the comparative anatomist * to make search after 
the root and origin of the form of species or difformity, 
which is in fact non-existent, rather than to make search 
after a law of formation, which must discover to him that 
uniformity is absolute unless when negatived by the sub- 
traction of quantity, which negation is and ever has been 
the ignis fatuus or intrenchent nothingness, impersonated 
only by the sound or name of difformity or species, and 
hence mistaken for an actual creation. 
Philosophical anatomy reaches to the comprehension of 
a law.t It beholds the creations of Nature as things 
comparable to one another, notwithstanding the existence. 
of proportional variety. It contemplates those creations — 
in the aggregate, and it reasons upon them in the abstract, 
invoking the adage “ ab uno disce omnes,” because all facts 
point to the oneness, and because in this oneness consists 
all the series of facts. Because unity is the abstract idea, 
and because all varieties still describe this abstract truth. 
Lastly, because all truths are abstractions, and because it 
is Nature herself who invites to this mode of contemplating | 
her works. The simple rule of a+6=c is an abstract idea, 
implying also that c—b=a. The comparison held be- 
tween two vertebral quantities is another, The “calculus 
infinitesimalis” is a more complex abstraction of the mind, 
and the “unity in variety” of anatomical reasoning is its 
counterpart law of certainty. From the simplest to the 
most complex mental operation, whether in mathematical 
calculation or in anatomical comparison, the reason passes 
through a series of abstractions, and the farther we pene- 
trate into the law the more general and comprehensive 
are the truths which it reveals.t The farther we advance 
in the rule of comparison the more extended becomes the 
field of analogies, and the nearer we approach to uni- 
formity the more does specific variety, difformity, and 
anomaly become dissipated in the light and revelation of 
a law of nature. — 
* © Nos nomenclateurs modernes, paraissent s’étre beaucoup moins souciés de restreindre ct reduire au juste le nombre des espéces ce qui 
‘néanmoins est /e vrai but du travail d'un naturaliste, que de les multiplier, chose bien moins difficile et par laquelle on brille aux yeux des 
‘ ignorants ; car la réduction des espéces suppose beaucoup de connaissances de réflexions et de comparaisons, au lieu qu’il n’y a rien de si aisé que 
3. 
d’ en augmenter la quantité.”—Buffon, Oiseaua, tom. i. p. 71. 
+ “ Les lois, dans la signification la plus étendue, sont les rapports nécessaires qui derivent de la nature des choses.” Montesquieu, Esprit 
des Lois, lib. i. chap. 1. 
{ “ En récherchant les lois suivant lesquelles sont formés des étres distincts vivant et agissant par eux-mémes, nous ne nous perdrons pas 
dans l’infini, mais nous nous instruirons sur ce qui nous concerne. 
L’idée geule d’un étre vivant, existant par lui-méme, s¢paré des autres et 
doué d’une certaine spontanéité, emporte avec elle /’idée d’une varicté infinie dans une unité absolue.”—Goethe, Gwres d’Hist. Nat. p. 69.. 
