FOREST TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 99 
Even if the burden of the State tax could be perfectly equalized 
as among counties by the State board of equalization, the relief to 
those now overburdened by all property taxes—State, county, and 
local—would be negligible. Suppose that the State tax were one- 
fifth of all taxes, and that this tax were perfectly equalized not only 
as among counties, but as among individual properties as well. Then, 
obviously, only one-fifth of the existing inequalities in the tax burden 
resulting from faulty assessment would be eliminated. As a matter 
of fact, however, State equalization is not between individual prop- 
erties, but rather between counties, and in consequence much less 
than one-fifth of the existing inequalities would be eliminated. For 
many properties the existing inequalities would even be increased, 
although in general it would be reasonable to expect some slight 
improvement. In a study of the effect of equalization in Wisconsin, 
however, a State in which the technic of equalization is highly devel- 
oped, it was found that State equalization caused no improvement 
in the dispersion of the average assessment ratios of farm, cut-over, 
timber, resort, and residential property classes. ‘These ratios were, 
on the average, just as far, if not farther, from the average assessment 
ration after equalization as before. 
As far back as 1906, a California tax commission reported (12, p. 
121). 
Equalization so-called, does not equalize and, in the nature of things, cannot 
equalize. After the officers have exhausted their best efforts in this direction, 
there are inequalities—glaring ones—between real estate and personal property; 
between different classes of personal property; between county and county; 
between city and city; between city and country; between man and man. All 
of which are rarely removed and often intensified by so-called ‘‘equalization.”’ 
It is stated in regard to Washington that— 
equalization among counties necessarily operates by increasing the State levy 
on all of the counties found underassessed as a whole. Thus, property that 
may be actually overassessed in such a county is further penalized by the in- 
creased State levy in the effort to properly tax the property that is underassessed 
(65, p. 20). 
To cite a concrete example from Michigan: The Michigan State 
Board of Equalization raised the total valuation of Menominee 
County $3,000,000 above the value determined by the county board. 
It was frankly admitted that the reason for the increase was that 
industrial corporations were undervalued by $3,000,000. Thus the 
additional State tax borne by the county as a result of equalization 
fell on all property in proportion to the original assessments, though 
farms and forests were not found to be underassessed (34, p. 47). 
ARBITRATION 
The arbitration of assessments is a legal provision of long standing 
peculiar to the State of Georgia. There are relatively few appeals to 
boards of arbitration in Georgia to make the final determination as to 
assessed value (2, p. 18). However, the effect of the law is consid- 
erable. In testimony before the United States. Supreme Court, 
taxing officials of this State explained: 
that if they attempted to impose anything like the real value, an arbitration was 
demanded, and the invariable result was a reduction of the assessment, so that 
there had come to be a generally understood acquiescence by county officials in 
low percentages.?0 
30 Bohler v. Callaway, 267 U. 8. 490. 
