FOREST TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 329 
indicate. Where the power to review is confined to the equalization 
of the aggregate valuations of the various counties, the supervision 
serves no purpose other than to prevent a county from. evading its 
just share of State taxes. Even where the State supervising agency 
may equalize aggregate valuations between units within the counties, 
the added power merely enables the State to see to it that no town 
or municipality escapes its due share of the county tax. Only in 
those cases where the State agency may make adjustments between 
individual properties may real equality be obtained, and, if it is to 
get evidence sufficient to perform this task well, it might almost as 
well make the original assessment. The power to compel a reassess- 
ment, though rarely invoked, may tend to improve the original work. 
Among the most useful functions performed by the State tax com- 
missions is the assessment of public utilities. 
A few States have obtained a certain degree of control over assess- 
ment practice through the power to appoint or remove local assessing 
officers. In Maryland a supervisor of taxes for each county is 
appointed by the tax commission from a list of five names submitted 
by the county commissioners. In South Carolina local assessors are 
appointed every 2 years by the governor upon the recommendation 
of the county delegation in the legislature. In Louisiana the parish 
board of equalization is composed “of 2 members chosen by the police 
jury (equivalent of county board of commissioners) and 1 chosen 
by the State tax commission. State administrative removal is 
employed in only eight States to even the slightest degree. The 
Governor of Colorado may, upon charges by the tax commission after 
a hearing, remove any local assessor from office if convinced that the 
assessor has willfully omitted to assess taxable property, or has failed 
to assess 1t at its true value. Likewise, the Governor of Minnesota 
may suspend or remove any financial officer, including an assessor, 
when it has been made to appear to him that such official is guilty 
of malfeasance. Assessors or supervisors may be removed by a 
State administrative agency in Indiana, Nebraska, Maryland, South 
Carolina, West Virginia, and Vermont (167, pp. 88-89). 
A scientific assessment is fundamental to a fair application of the 
property tax, and assessment by local untrained assessors has gener- 
ally failed to result in a fair and impartial assessment. Local assess- 
ment has almost always meant competitive underassessment, despite 
the fact that underassessment invites and conceals inequality. 
Indeed fairness and equity are so dependent on full-value assessment 
that one authority recommends that State aid for any purpose be 
conditioned on full-value assessment (4, p. 5). There is much to be 
said for having the original assessment made by the State. Certainly, 
elemental justice demands that the State insure a greater degree of 
equality than now obtains in most States. 
ACCOUNTING 
Perhaps in no other field has local government been more deficient 
and more in need of supervision and assistance than in its accounting 
and financial practices. In recognition of this need, practically 
every State has provided for some form of supervision by a State 
agency. The law in many instances is admitted to be inadequate, 
and its administration is often faulty, but the right of supervision is 
at least recognized. 
