FOREST TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 507 
from taxation, are not a contract between the landowner and the 
State, and specific taxes may be changed at any time.’ This opinion 
was occasioned by the 1927 amending act, increasing the specific 
tax on softwood land from 5 to 10 cents per acre, which tax the 
attorney general holds must be paid upon all land, whether classified 
prior to the amending act or not. ; 
Irrespective of constitutionality, forest-tax contracts are inadvis- 
able on general grounds, especially if they run for a long term of 
years. No one at the present time knows what conditions will be 
during whatever period the contract may cover, and to tie up the 
State to a certain line of action for that period of time may work 
erave injustice, either to the owner or to the State. During the 
period of the contract our monetary system, for but one instance, 
might be quite different from what it is now, and a 10-cent-per-acre 
tax or a $2 assessment at that future date might not be at all what 
was contemplated when the statute was enacted and made rigid by 
contract, 
In order that private owners may be persuaded to accept the con- 
tract, a means is usually offered them of declassifying their land at 
any time they wish to do so. The State, on the other hand, is 
usually bound to abide by the contract for as long as the owner com- 
plies with the modest restrictions placed upon him in regard to the 
management of his land. A State should certainly be wary of such 
one-sided arrangements. 
SPECIAL CONCESSIONS TO FORESTRY 
Many forest properties are so burdened by costs that they cannot 
be operated as commercially profitable enterprises. It is sometimes 
urged that the State remedy this condition by offering a special tax 
concession to forestry; tax exemptions, tax rebates, taxation at 
especially low rates, and other favors of this sort have been often 
proposed and, in a limited way, have been frequently granted. 
As was pointed out in part 1 (p. 9) of this report, all such favors 
are repugnant to the general theory of taxation, which presumes that 
all elements of the community will contribute toward the cost of 
gvovernment according to some equitable rule of apportionment. A 
tax concession granted to one interest necessitates an increased tax 
burden upon all other interests. Moreover, such special favors, if 
they accomplish the desired result, tend to direct industry into une- 
conomic channels. Any industry which does not bear its fair share 
of the costs of government has a heavy burden of proof to show 
that it is not a parasite upon the other industries of the community. 
It is no defense to show that the industry seeking special considera- 
tion is meritorious—has great public value—since the same may be 
said of all other legitimate industries. For example, it may be urged 
that forestry is of great service to the public. But so is agriculture 
and manufacturing and transportation. There is here no sound or 
workable basis for the granting of tax favors. 
The foregoing conclusion is in no sense contradicted by the fact that 
the Government may be compelled in the public interest to take cog- 
nizance of the necessity of preserving some sort of vegetative cover on 
mountain lands for the protection of property at lower elevations 
against soil erosion and destructive floods in periods of heavy rainfall 
and against the drying up of springs, streams, and wells in periods of 
