514 INSTINCT OF INSECTS. 
I must premise, however, that in so perplexed and in- 
tricate a field, Iam sensible how necessary it is to tread 
with caution. A far greater collection of facts must be 
made, and the science of metaphysics generally be placed 
ona more solid foundation than it now can boast, before 
we can pretend to decide, in numerous cases, which of 
the actions of insects are to be deemed purely instinctive, 
and which the result of reason. What I advance, there- 
fore, on this head, I wish to be regarded rather as con- 
jectures, that, after the best consideration I am able to 
give to a subject so much beyond my depth, seem to me 
plausible, than as certainties to which I require your im- 
plicit assent. 
That reason has nothing to do with the major part of 
the actions of insects is clear, as I have before observed, 
from the determinateness and perfection of these actions, 
and from their being performed independently of instruc- 
tion and experience. A young bee (I must once more 
repeat) betakes itself to the complex operation of building 
cells, with as much skill as the oldest of its compatriots. 
We cannot suppose that it has any /nowledge of the pur- 
poses for which the cells are destined; or of the effects 
that will result from its feeding the young larvae, and the 
like. And if an individual bee be thus destitute of the 
very materials of reasoning as to its main operations, so 
must the society in general. 
Nor in those remarkable deviations and accommoda- 
tions to circumstances, instanced under a former head, 
can we, for considerations there assigned, suppose in- 
sects to be influenced by reason. These deviations are 
still limited in number, and involve acts far too complex 
and recondite to spring from any process of ratiocina- 
