MH CAPTURE. OR: MALACCA, “A:D: (T5LL: ho 
could wait no more. Even at this stage, war was not what he 
wanted, nor did it suit the Malays. A situation of extreme delicacy 
is always fraught with dire peril; and in this case the accidental 
(or semi-accidental) firing of an alarm-gun on a Protuguese ship 
led to hostilities over some petty mistake. The fighting was half- 
hearted but it spread. The Malays on board the Portuguese ship 
jumped into the sea; such European sailors as happened to be on 
shore were seized and captured. Teixeira saw the error when too 
late. He was too weak to attack the sullen angry city that had 
now broken off all relations with him; the monsoon was dying 
away; his ships were sadly in need of repair; and in the end he 
had to sail home having tarnished the fame of his country and left 
his luckless comrades at the mercy of their foes. 
According to Malay ideas the Bendahara was the leader of the 
resistance to Sequeira. He had done no fighting; indeed he had 
done nothing at all; but a statesman who achieves stupendous 
results by the simple process of inaction is a man who deserves 
better of his country than the hero of a hundred costly fights. So 
thought the people; so, doubtless, thought the Bendahara himseH. 
The Sultan thought otherwise. He saw that “Uncle Mutahir’ was 
becoming far too great a personage; and he recalled many old 
grievances against his minister. There was the avuncular wealth 
to be garnered ; and there was that little matter of the Bendahara’s 
daughter which had never been explained to His Highness’s proper 
satisfaction. His Highness sent two of his followers to summon 
the Bendahara “to God's presence” as they politely put it. The 
Bendahara bowed his head and died. The men of his household 
died with him; his daughter was carried off to the harem of the 
Sultan ; and his riches were dissipated in festivities at the wedding 
of the Sultan’s daughter to the son of the Ruler of Pahang. 
Suddenly in the very midst of all this wassail the King’s joy was 
turned into bewilderment by the unexpected reappearance of the 
Portuguese fleet—this time in overpowering strength under the 
Viceroy d’ Albuquerque himself. 
As soon as King Emmanuel had heard of the disaster to 
Sequeira he had sent (March, 1510) three ships under Diego Mendez 
- de Vasconcellos to avenge the defeat. These ships sailed first to 
India to consult with d’Albuquerque- The great Viceroy was too 
- expert a commander to weaken his forces by dispersing them into 
detachments; he detained Vasconcellos depending the complete 
subjugation af Goa and the organization of the naval base in India. 
Tren when all was ready in the early Summer of 1511, d’ Albuquerque 
sailed out to attack Malacca with every ship and soldier that he 
‘could muster. On the Ist July, 1511, he appeared in the roads 
with the entire force of Portuguese India,—nineteen ships, 800 
European soldiers and 600 native sepoys,—with trumpets sounding 
banners waving, guns firing, and every demonstration that might 
be éxpected to create a panic among the junks in the harbour and 
the warriors in the town. , 
R, A. Soc., No. 61, 1912, 
