July 4, 1884.] 



SCIENCE. 



17 



the plan of the work is, first, the collection of 

 a vast number of authentic observations upon 

 the lower animals (this, with general com- 

 ments, occupies the whole of the volume upon 

 i Animal intelligence ') ; second, a close analysis 

 of the tests of mincl, its physical basis, and the 

 means we have of determining its presence ; 

 third, an examination of the mental faculties, 

 such as consciousness, sensation and percep- 

 tion, instinct and reason, in their higher and 

 lower manifestations ; fourth, the application 

 of actual observations to the determination of 

 the various levels in the animal scale at which 

 these phenomena of consciousness, sensation, 

 and so on, appear ; finally, a full discussion of 

 the problem of instinct, as arising parallel with 

 intelligence. The chief merits, as well as the 

 special and almost insurmountable difficulties 

 of Mr. Romanes' work, are met with in these 

 last two sections. In the accumulation of well- 

 ascertained facts, he has started in a sound 

 scientific method : the interpretation of these 

 facts is a most delicate task. 



Is a certain act prompted by instinct, or in- 

 telligence? Does it indicate conscious choice, 

 or merely the response of reflex action to a 

 certain stimulus? Does it indicate a knowl- 

 edge of the relation of means to end ? These 

 are subtle problems all along the line from the 

 anthropoid ape to the Amoeba : their inter- 

 pretation by the two schools of psychologists 

 is often directly contradictory, yet upon this 

 the whole argument must rest. * The difficul- 

 ties increase as we descend the scale. The 

 minds of others can only be known as ideal 

 projections of our own mental states. Here 

 arises the doubt, in applying our criteria of 

 mind to particular cases, which increases as 

 we recede from minds like our own to those 

 less so, passing into a gradual series to not- 

 minds. 



The observations in the first volume under 

 consideration relate to members of all the 

 larger divisions of the animal kingdom. Their 

 number and variety are surprising ; and, al- 

 though the author has carefully endeavored to 

 exclude all those in the least degree doubtful, 

 inam r of them will appear incredible to persons 

 unfamiliar with this class of literature. These 

 anecdotes form a superb field for induction ; 

 yet many of them are marred for scientific 

 purposes by the hasty conclusions of the ob- 

 servers, which are appended. In the closing 

 chapter upon monkeys, there is a novel diary 

 of the habits of a brown capuchin, which was 

 written for two months by Miss Romanes. 



In the second volume, before seeking to 

 determine the levels at which we meet the lower 



and higher mental phenomena, the author tries 

 to show very clearly his own conception of 

 mind, and by what means we can legitimately 

 infer its presence in an animal. u The dis- 

 tinctive element of mind," he says, " is con- 

 sciousness, and the test of consciousness is the 

 power of choice." The function of selective 

 discrimination with the complementary power 

 of adaptive response is regarded as the root- 

 principle of mind ; and it is found only in 

 agents which are capable of feeling. These 

 root-principles of feeling and choice may be 

 traced down into the vegetable kingdom, where, 

 for example, we find an insectivorous plant 

 rejecting a bit of glass, but feeling and closing 

 upon a fly. To the objection that plants are 

 not in any proper sense capable of feeling, the 

 author allows that at the bottom of the scale 

 the terms have lost all their original meaning ; 

 yet the apparent abuse of terms serves well to 

 emphasize the fact of the gradual dawn of these 

 powers. The great stress of Mr. Romanes' 

 argument, as a consistent evolutionist, is the 

 universal gradation which we find throughout 

 the scale, which he strictly maintains is one of 

 degree only, although it may appear to be one 

 of kind. With this principle of gradation 

 constantly in mind, the reader will be less sur- 

 prised at some of the author's conclusions. 



We see feeling and choice acquiring the 

 semblance of their higher meaning among the 

 coelenterates, in the Medusae for example, 

 where we first find definite sense-organs. In 

 this group, accordingly, following Spencer, the 

 author discovers l the raw material of con- 

 sciousness.' Here arises another difficulty 

 in distinguishing between the mental choice of 

 consciousness, and the apparent, but not real 

 mental choice of reflex action ; and the only 

 distinction that can be drawn consists in the 

 latter " depending on inherited mechanisms 

 within the nervous s}'stem, being so constructed 

 as to effect particular adaptive movements in 

 response to particular stimulations, while the 

 former are independent of any such inherited 

 adjustments." Reflex choice is habitual and 

 invariable : mental choice decides between one 

 of two alternatives", in case of new experience. 

 Sensation is feeling aroused by a stimulus, and 

 always attended by consciousness ; and. to- 

 gether with the rise of conscious choice, we 

 meet the dawn of intelligence, or mind as we 

 generally understand it. Does the organism 

 learn b}* its own individual as distinguished 

 from its race experience? If it does so, its 

 mind is placed beyond the area of merely 

 reflex action. 



Having advanced thus far, the author first 



