318 
supplies above mentioned would probably be 
consumed, together with the regular ration, 
instead of serving to extend it over a longer 
period. ‘There is every reason for believing 
that the supply of fresh meat or game at the 
station is extremely precarious, accessible only 
during a few summer months, and perhaps 
practically absent in certain years. There is 
therefore reason to suppose that the supplies 
of the expedition will be entirely exhausted by 
the beginning of next winter. 
On the failure to reach the party in 1882, 
it may be supposed that every care would be 
taken by its commander to economize supplies 
for the retreat last fall. This could not be 
carried very far; because the stamina of the 
men, already weakened by two years of arctic 
exposure, would not bear any great reduction 
oftheration. Itis probable that Greely would 
have learned by the second summer, that delay- 
ing until September might prove fatal to his 
plan of retreat. He probably started south, 
if at all, in July or August, 1883. Weassume 
that the party were living and in reasonably 
good health at that time. 
The distance from Discovery Bay to Cape 
Sabine (see map) is about two hundred and 
fifty miles. ‘The shore is bold and precipitous ; 
the northern half compact, and almost without 
inlets or bays; and the usual ice-foot along the 
rocky walls of Kennedy Channel is, on this side, 
liable to be much broken by the grinding of 
floes against it. In this stretch of coast there 
are three caches of provisions. ‘The first, at 
Carl Ritter Bay, seventy-five miles south from 
Lady Franklin Bay, contains two hundred and 
twenty-five rations, deposited by Greely him- 
self in 1881, and sufficient to sustain his party 
for nine days. Sixty-two miles farther south, 
at Cape Collinson, are ten days’ provisions, 
left by Nares in 1875. Fifty miles farther 
south, at Cape Hawkes, is a cache of unknown 
extent, but which Greely thought, in 1881, 
would subsist his party fortwo months. These, 
however, were partly in bad condition in 1881, 
and probably still worse in 1883. 
Of the dogs taken by Greely, only eleven 
survived until the date of his last report, a 
number hardly more than sufficient to haul 
their own food from Lady Franklin Bay to 
Cape Sabine. It may be assumed that any 
attempt of the Greely party to retreat by means 
of sledges alone, would be unsuccessful and 
disastrous. If attempted, it probably would 
result in a return to their old quarters later in 
the season, as their only safety for the winter. 
Sledging over the hummocks of Kennedy Chan- 
nel and Kane Basin is terrible work, and not 
SCIENCE. 
* eo 
[Vor. IIL, No, 60. 
to be compared with that done on open field- 
ice, like that of the sea north of Robeson 
Channel, or that crossed by Anjou, Wrangell, 
and De Long. 
The practicability of a successful retreat to 
Cape Sabine, we believe, depended entirely” 
upon whether the party were able to use their 
boats, and avail themselves occasionally of 
their sledges to make portages over ice isth- 
muses in their way. ‘They were furnished with 
boats prepared especially for the purpose, be- 
sides a steam-launch, for which an abundant 
supply of coal might be procured from the coal 
strata near the station. 
It is improbable, unless continuous water 
communication happened to favor them, that 
the party could transport their effects and rec- 
ords, together with a year’s provisions for all 
hands. They could hardly take, in the four 
boats, more than eight tons besides themselves, 
and probably not more than six tons if any 
coal was carried in the launch. <A year’s pro- 
visions for all hands would weigh over fourteen 
tons. It would be necessary, therefore, for 
them to rely upon the stores they expected the 
relief-ship to cache on the east side of Grin- 
nell Land in 1882, and upon the other caches 
already mentioned, to supply the deficiencies 
of their means of transportation. 
It is highly probable, also, if the strength 
of the party had in any way become seriously 
impaired, that they would find it necessary 
(failing continuous land-water along the Grin- 
nell Land coast) to abandon all but two of 
their boats, and as much of every thing else 
as they dared, to get through to the southern 
entrance of Kane Basin. Whether, if arrived 
at Cape Sabine, the caches there would suffice 
to pass them safely through the winter, does 
not seem to be certain from the rather confused 
statements in regard to it. It is also possible 
(as happened to the English on some occa- 
sions) that the condition of the ice alongshore 
might be such that the caches at Carl Ritter 
Bay or Cape Collinson, or both, might be inac- 
cessible from the water. 
We may conclude from the above facts and 
assumptions, that (1°) if the Greely party were 
able to use their boats, and reached Cape Sa- 
bine safely last fall, the probability of finding 
them there at open water is reasonably good ; 
(2°) if they were not able to use their boats, 
they either wintered at the station (in which 
case they are probably in fair condition, but will 
be reached with difficulty, and must be reached 
within the year to save them), or they made an 
attempt to sledge southward to Cape Sabine, 
and can hardly have escaped serious disas- 
