622 
nivorous forms; and many of the fishes are 
pre-eminent for formidable armature, and some 
for extraordinary modifications for obtaining 
food. 
SMITH SOUND, AND ITS EXPLORA- 
TION. 
A MORE opportune moment could not have been 
selected by Dr. Bessels for publishing? a condensa- 
tion of the literature relating to Smith Sound. Add- 
ed to the interest which arctic narrative has always 
possessed, is the concern felt for Lieut. Greely and his 
party, and the hopes and fears awakened by the de- 
parture of the expedition for his relief. Many per- 
sons will therefore be glad to learn something of the 
region, which, with all its terrors and hardships, has 
been sufficiently attractive to again and again induce 
men to risk life and limb in the attempt to penetrate 
its mysteries. For that class of readers, Dr. Bessels’ 
paper was, possibly, originally designed. But in re- 
lating the history of the more recent expeditions, 
especially those carried on under the auspices of the 
signal-office, the author has been so severe in his 
criticisms and reflections, that his production, while 
possessing the faults, has likewise the interest, of a 
polemic. Paragraphs like the following will certainly 
not fail in attracting attention for want of severity. 
‘““This plan, termed the Howgate plan, was devoid of 
all sound originality. The valuable parts of it are 
based on the work of Hayes and Weyprecht; the 
rest, emanating from the brain of Lieut. Henry W. 
Howgate, bears testimony that the originator of the 
‘Howgate plan’ was not familiar with even the 
rudiments of arctic exploration” (p. 414). ‘* Lady 
Franklin Bay should have been the last place cho- 
sen aS a permanent or temporary station”’ (p. 416). 
‘“‘That this plan [Howgate or Signal-service plan] 
would lead to disaster was pointed out by myself 
and others at an early date; but the judgment of the 
chief signal-officer in arctic matters was considered 
supreme, and upon him rests the responsibility of its 
failure. Several names comunected with the signal- 
office will not easily be forgotten in arctic history ’”’ 
(p. 418). ‘The Proteus is now at the bottom of the 
sea; and all the arguments I could offer would not be 
able to raise her, or to relieve the ice-bound party in 
Lady Franklin Bay. The person responsible for the 
disaster is the chief signal-officer’’ (p. 435). ‘‘ The 
preceding paragraph embodies the substance of his 
(Garlington’s) instructions, as given and signed by 
W. B. Hazen, Brig. and Bvt. Maj. Gen’), chief sig- 
nal-officer, U. S. A.” (p. 481). ‘“It clearly shows 
that those who wrote Garlington’s orders were ut- 
terly ignorant of the nature and character of the 
country to be traversed”’ (p. 436). 
Other quotations might be made, which would 
show that the signal-service is not alone censured. 
The explorations of Sir John Ross and Hayes, and 
the conduct of Buddington, are all criticised more or 
less severely. Ross and Hayes are dead, and can 
1 Proceedings of the U. S. naval institute, vol. x., no. 3. 
SCIENCE. 
[Vou. III., No. 68. 
make no reply; Buddington, according to Bessels, is 
not proficient in the art of writing, and we can 
expect nothing from him. But Gen. Hazen has a 
pen, which he has at times used with considerable 
effect; and it is possible that he may see fit to raise 
the low temperature of the present controversy to a 
height not at all in accordance with the normal of 
arctic literature. 
But, on the whole, the strictures upon the signal- 
service expeditions appear to be just and proper. 
The folly of intrusting the organization and details 
of an arctic exploring-party to a board composed of 
persons without special experience, has been forcibly 
brought to notice by the failure of both relief expe- 
ditions; and possibly it will be made more prominent 
when we know more of Lieut. Greely’s situation 
and experiences. That such a board should advise 
many unwise things, and propose schemes and plans 
more or less impracticable, was in the nature of 
things. But that success should be expected from 
nautical expeditions to the polar seas, which were 
commanded by persons not only without arctic expe- 
rience, but ignorant of the art of navigation and the 
management of ships, seems incredible. Certainly 
Greely’s party, as well as those undertaking his 
relief, should have had the benefit of the best arctic 
and nautical experience, assistance, and advice. 
That they did not have it is evidently the fault of 
the originators of the Lady Franklin Bay plan, and 
the devisers of the details of its execution. 
But, while careful to point out the errors in origi- 
nation and execution of the signal-service expedi- 
tions, Dr. Bessels appears to entirely overlook the 
fact that the Polaris expedition, of which he was a 
member, was so constituted as to invite, if not in- 
sure, failure. Hall, its commander, though of great 
arctic experience, was entirely ignorant of ships, 
their management, navigation, and capabilities. He 
was also entirely an uncultivated man, and little 
fitted to observe or study phenomena in their scien- 
tific aspects. His sole qualification for the direction 
of a polar expedition was his enthusiasm and interest 
in arctic exploration. To supply his deficiencies, 
the Polaris party was peculiarly organized. The care 
and management of the ship were in the hands of 
Buddington. The scientific corps was under the di- 
rection of Dr. Bessels. Hall was to supply the steam 
necessary to run this rather complicated machinery. 
Naturally, from such an organization, continual con- 
troversy was to be expected; and controversy, under 
the circumstances, would necessarily seriously affect 
the success of the undertaking. But the instructions 
issued by'the Navy department provided, that, in 
case of Hall’s death, the control of future operations 
should be shared by Buddington and Bessels; the 
former being supreme as far as the vessel was con- 
cerned, the latter equally supreme in the direction 
of matters on shore. 
the possibilities were, that either scientific observa- 
tions would be sacrificed to the supposed interests of — 
the vessel, or that the real interests and safety of the - 
vessel would be sacrificed to a supposed necessity for 
Such a provision could but — 
tend to a failure in all respects. During Hall’s life 
