250 The Ethics of Opinion. 
which I have adopted of approaching the subject is not 
without some important advantages. It leads at once to a 
fundamental principle in the heart of the question, and 
avoids allthose metaphysical labyrinths in which the real points 
at issue are so often lost, and in which the difficulties appear 
all the more colossal, as they are purely imaginary. We all 
know the magnifying properties of the lens of fancy. I will 
only premise that this paper was written without any inten- 
tion of thus producing it ; without indeed any definite pur- 
pose whatsoever ; but when I was hesitating as to its disposal, 
it was suggested to me that it would be desirable to introduce 
some such variety into your proceedings. 
I now proceed to consider the Ethics of Opinion and 
Action ; or how far men are properly lable to praise or 
blame, reward or punishment, for their thoughts or actions. 
THE ETHICS OF OPINION AND ACTION. 
In questions of historical or legal evidence, of mathema- 
tics, of logic, or of any practical science, the final human 
test of truth, is consistency; of doubtful alternatives, choice 
is invariably determined by their respective degrees of con- 
sistency with what has been. previously, in the same way, 
apprehended and accepted as most certain. Reasoning itself 
is nothing but the process by which that which Is, is distin- 
_ guished from that which Is NoT ; and that which is consistent 
with experience, from that which is inconsistent with it. If 
there be an axiom which must be universally regarded as ab- 
solutely certain and impregnable, it is this: that a thing 
cannot be, and not be, at the same time. And simply be- — 
cause the one is inconsistent with the other. Of so great — 
importance then is consistency. Even such an axiom as that — 
quoted would have to give way, were aggregated experience ~ 
at any time in future to furnish preponderating evidence of 
facts with which it would be clearly inconsistent. Of course — 
such a revolution in the primitive data upon which human ~ 
knowledge and reasoning are founded, cannot be imagined; — 
and I only propose it to show that even in our most funda- _ 
mental judgments, consistency is, as I at first stated, our final 
test of truth. q 
In matters of opinion, however, it is surprising (or would — 
be so but for certain considerations), how far this universal 
criterion is disregarded ; either as inadequate, or as too strin- — 
gent, it is often treated as inapplicable. We find among men ~ 
