The Ethics of Opinion. | 251 
of every degree of ability, many who are accustomed to 
entertain some theoretical opinions which they must fail to 
find consistent with others that they regard as alike incon- 
trovertible, as well as with the principles upon which they 
instinctively act every day of theirlives. Of this, of course, they 
are wholly unconscious, having in one way or another, gene- 
rally as children, imbibed certain views as bases of their 
judgments of right and wrong, which in after reasoning they 
assume as uncontested starting points or fixed data, and 
therefore never question ; they shun all investigation of them 
as unnecessary and profitless, and shelve them when circum- 
stances force anomalies upon their notice, as “ mysteries,” 
_ inexplicable or sacred. 
We find that in practical physical matters, similar pre- 
judices are now and then assailed, and slowly but surely 
exploded, as inconsistent with the facts of progressive scien- 
tific discovery. The difficulty with which new inventions 
and discoveries are adopted, is sufficient proof of the power 
of habit and custom to obstruct the exposure of time- 
honoured delusions. I need only to name Galileo, Harvey, 
Jenner, and George Stephenson, as my witnesses. In such 
eases, however, facts are indeed stubborn things, and though 
the old fallacies die hard, they must succumb. 
With matters of opinion, and especially of moral philoso- 
phy, the case is unfortunately different. For from their 
-nature, theoretical errors obtain a stronger and far more 
insidious hold upon the human imagination. They are 
easier of acquisition, and more difficult to extirpate ; for 
in practical life we are rarely brought into a position 
to observe their antagonism to the facts calculated to expose 
them; and when we are, we are generally so engrossed 
with instinctively getting out of the passing difficulty, that 
we either entirely overlook the discrepancies, or postpone con- 
sideration of them till a more convenient season, which 
seldom arrives. In the hurry of life they are thus neglected 
by many of the thoughtful, as well as by all the thoughtless ; 
for the former frequently live so little in the crowd that they 
meet with few favourable opportunities of checking and cor- 
recting their philosophy, while the latter have no philosophy 
to check. And it is not upon all the thoughtful, nor upon 
all among them who are also busy and observant, but simply 
upon a few of that section of them, who, having the inclina- 
tion and opportunity, are also enabled to secure sufficient 
leisure to prosecute such studies, that all have really to 
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