254 The Hthics of Oprnion. 
‘men, more than one or two, who would have been much 
; fee and more useful had they occasionally met and con- 
“versed with people who did not agree with them.”* The 
same spirit of liberality speaks to the conclusion of the essay. 
How much more pleasant it is to bear testimony to the 
merits than to the defects of anyone, but particularly of one 
whom we respect! But as ago says, “J am nothing, if not 
eritical.” The passage to which I wish particularly to advert 
is this (p. 318): 
“ Now, no doubt, to think wrong,is wrong; and deserves 
“blame. Nobody has a right to form a wrong opinion.” 
Now this dictum appears to me calculated to open the door to 
the worst forms of intolerance, and to be opposed to the fun- 
damental principles of moral criticism. Let us examine it 
closely and test it at once, by applying it to an ordinary 
though an extreme case. 
I ask, do you not blame a murderer for murdering, solely 
because you believe that he THOUGHT RIGHTLY—that to 
murder was-wrong? And do you not exempt him from 
blame exactly in so far as you believe that he may have 
THOUGHT WRONGLY, that to murder was right? If a mur- 
derer really think himself right in killing his victim, you 
may call him insane or stupid, but you could not BLAME him 
any more than you would blame the victim were he in self- 
defence to kill his intending murderer ; he, in so doing would 
assuredly think himself right. You blame the murderer, 
distinctly BECAUSE you assume that he knew better—that he 
THOUGHT RIGHTLY ; and that he acted in opposition to what 
HE THOUGHT was right. You blame him Nor, if you have 
reason to believe that he THOUGHT (WRONGLY) that to murder 
would be right. For erroneous (7.é., wrong) thought, you not 
only do not blame, but for the same reason you actually also 
forbear to blame for AcTS, which you would otherwise regard 
as blameable. Thus, if a.man’s thought and act concur, he 
cannot be a proper object of blame. If he act contrary to 
what he think right (.e., uvconscientiously), he will be as 
justly amenable to evil consequences as if he put his finger 
in the fire. If he act as he think right (¢.¢.,, conscientiously), 
you cannot blame him. Consequently, a man cannot pro- 
perly be blamed for what he thinks, nor punished but for 
what he does. Consequently, also, thought must be blame- 
* See Frazer’s Magazine, March 1867, pp. 827. ‘ Concerning the Treat- 4 
ment of those who differ from us in Opinion.” By ‘ A.K,H.B,” e 
