The Ethics of Opvnion. 255 
less, even if erroneous; and as the only valid excuse for an 
erroneous thought or act is, that it co-exists with uncon- 
sciousness of error, and is the best or rather absolute result 
of constitution, education, and circumstances united : 
thought must be essentially instinctive in its origin and in- 
evitable, being beyond the option or control of the man ; 
in one word, INVOLUNTARY. Punishment for evil acts, is 
nevertheless, incontestably justifiable and necessary, as a 
warning to possible offenders and for security to all, whether 
such acts be perpetrated conscientiously or unconscien- 
tiously, whether the thought and act concur with the agent 
or not. 
That no one may misunderstand my use above of the word 
INVOLUNTARY, I must explain, that though, physiologically, 
motions of which the cerebro-spinal nervous system forms the 
medium, are, generally speaking, contradistinctively called 
voluntary, and those which are produced through the sym- 
pathetic nervous system, involuntary ; still both are actually 
involuntary. The true distinction I conceive to be this: 
The cerebro-spinal system receives peripherally afferent im- 
pressions, which cause, or are at the nervous centre converted 
into, corresponding efferent expressions or motions, as neces- 
sary, and strictly speaking, involuntary consequences. Such 
motions being mostly external, we become so far conscious 
of them sensationally. In the sympathetic system, and in the 
ease of all those nerves not concerned in so-called voluntary 
action, the afferent impressions and the consequent efferent 
expressions are internal or insensible, and therefore further 
removed from our observation and cognizance; hence they 
are technically regarded as more involuntary than the others. 
Both, however, are equally absolute consequences of their 
antecedents. My use of the word INVOLUNTARY, is there- 
fore popular rather than technical ; but I adopt it, because I 
recollect no other so well calculated to express repudiation of 
the common fallacy, that motions which are both physiolo- 
gically and popularly called voluntary, are caused by the will 
alone, and not by external impressions. Such a theory is 
clearly incompatible with the ascertained scientific fact, that 
all efferent expressions have their full adequate causes in 
afferent impressions. In fact, afferent nerves would other- 
wise be entirely superfluous and useless, for there would then 
be two adequate causes of the same effects. | 
In connection with this part of my subject, I would point 
out one or two other ways in which the freewill theoryis most 
