The Ethics of Opinion. 261 
solution. I demur also to his use of the words, “ SERVED 
Him.” My reason shall appear presently. 
Society DID right in removing the man, for he had forfeited 
his right to its protection, by violating that of others to the 
same. And society would have been justified in removing 
him in ANY manner BEST CALCULATED to prevent repetition or 
imitation of his act. For society in dealing with him, should 
regard, not HIS FORFEITED interest, but that of its more 
worthy members; of its aggregate body. “ Prisoner at the 
“bar,” said a wise English judge, “ You will be hanged, not 
“because you have stolen a horse, but in order that horses 
“may not be stolen,” condensing into one sentence the whole 
true principle of moral.and penal legislation. 
But as it was in effect conceded that the man who 
murdered his wife and children ACTED ON HIS BELIEF—as his 
thought and act concurred—as thus he was CONSCIENTIOUS, 
society would have clearly done wrong to BLAME him. 
Blame thus is not only entirely unjust, but essentially 
mischievous. For no man ever, NATURALLY, feels himself 
deserving of it. It is notorious that nearly (@f not) every 
man instinctively finds ample excuses for his own conduct 
in any conceivable circumstances; and I maintain, that 
though a man may, in one way, blame himself for errors in 
conduct, not only will he energetically deny the justice of 
blame experienced from another, but he will in every case 
deny, EVEN TO HIMSELF, that his errors have been other than 
of judgment. Instinctively, necessarily, and rightly too. 
I challenge each man’s impartial introspection. Nothing but 
the most cowardly abdication of thought, and abject servility 
to a false education and a paralysing superstition, could ever. 
delude a reasoning being into believing himself, even theo- 
retically, actually WORSE THAN HIS OWN DEGRADED NATURE. 
Surely the most certain and effectual way to become every- 
thing villainous and base, is to believe one’s self such already. 
If this be so, blame does not and cannot operate salutarily 
on anyone, but simply arouses feelings of antipathy, recipro- 
cation of the blame ; and as a person who blames is past 
reason (for every excuse advanced appears to him only an 
- aggravation of the offence), it is but the unique and prolific 
source of mutual hatred and all uncharitableness. 
The fact is, that A.K.H.B’s “difficulty” lies in his failure to 
recognise the broad distinction which nature teaches us, 
between the improper subjection to blame, and the legitimate 
amenability to punishment, of any offender. Nature is our 
