262 The Kthics of Opinion. 
best and unerring tutor and example. Nature never fails to 
punish, never condones an offence, not even the first; she 
invariably punishes for evil acts done—even those persons 
whom man would blindly call morally innocent rather 
than none. Children often really suffer for the errors of their 
parents, an anomaly which it is simply impossible to justify 
by any fantastic, unnatural principles, which are thereby 
proved to be entirely illusory. We know that by an inexor- 
able necessity this is so, and can discover that we are thus 
furnished with an invaluable rule of conduct and pattern of 
government. Should we not hence learn that our common 
notions of morality are as factitious and unnatural as they 
are notoriously unsuccessful and nugatory ? Is it not true that 
our administration of praise and blame is but a chimerical 
and pernicious device to govern thought, while neglecting to 
modify its antecedents? That its causes being unchanged, 
thought being involuntary, must be ungovernable ; and that 
the judicious distribution of physical pleasuresand pains, is the 
only real and operative method of governing human beings. 
Through our balancing of imaginary desert for praise and 
blame do we not frequently—aye, and consciously, mismeasure 
punishment, or withhold it altogether ?—yes, incontestably ; 
and hence the glaring inefliciency of our retributory laws ; 
criminals, at least, know only too well how to appreciate the — 
consequent impunity they enjoy. 
As a striking illustration of the fact that our ordinary 
notions of moral responsibility are not only arbitrary but in- 
consistent, and that the propriety of blame is not a necessary — 
corollary of that of punishment, [ would here point out that 
exactly in proportion as we find in a child a strong mherent 
tendency or original propensity to a bad habit; so do we, 
failing other means, augment punishment until we succeed in 
counteracting it. Notwithstanding that we must to the same 
extent exonerate the child from culpability for what we know , 
to be a constitutional defect; and therefore the more we 
punish the less we blame. Is not the pain we feel in inflict- 
ing such punishment an instinctive testimony or acknow- 
ledgment that it is not merited? That we administer it 
with sorrow, but with the knowledge also, that like the | 
amputation of a limb, it is indispensable to future welfare ? 
All nature’s punishments are exactly proportioned to the 
offence, and are absolutely certain in their accomplishment. 
Who questions this impugns the justice of nature or. of God. 
Nature’s punishments are unquestionably not always in- 
eS ee ee eee eee ee See 
