264 The Ethics of Opinion. 
viduals during life, were entirely pertinent in discussing the 
value of a secular basis for morality, it should materially 
help rather than militate against my argument. For we 
should feel all the LEss scruple at removing a mischievous or 
dangerous person by death, if any injustice he may suffer 
here, can be compensated hereafter. Whereas, the ordinary 
arguments used by the opponents of capital punishment 
would lead us to suppose that it is better to be unjustly 
cruel to innocent society, and as unjustly merciful to the 
unworthy criminal, than to send him where society would 
be simply rid of him, and where it is imagined that he will 
certainly meet with absolute and infallible justice. 
But the passage which I have principally questioned con- 
tains also such a simple error of logic, that it would be 
amazing how so competent a writer could have fallen into it, 
if it were not that it furnished such a ready way of its 
kind of attaching blame, (in conformity with ordinary secta- 
rian habits and prejudices) to persons whom I have shown 
nevertheless to be blameless, according to “ A.K.H.B,’s” own 
principles. Let me explain where this error lies, though to 
many it must be obvious enough. He says, “To think 
wrong, is wrong;” meaning, to think incorrectly, is culpa- 
ble; or, an error of judgment involves turpitude. He 
entirely confuses between the wholly distinct and different 
meanings of the word “WRONG,” viz., error with, and error 
without, evil intention. That I interpret his words correctly, 
is | think unquestionable; for the second “wrong,” he at 
once himself defines as equivalent to “deserved blame;’ 
and the first is next made, by a slight inflection, to mean 
“a wrong opinion.” 
Whether however my views be accurate or not, if hore 
who read “ A.K.H.B.’s” essay be led, by their own thoughts 
or by my suggestions upon this part of it, to adopt the same 
or a better method of treating its obvious inconsistencies, 
and to advance in moral science; it is clear that the very 
defects of the treatise may prove its most valuable portion. 
For, whereas, as regards the major part of it, with which all 
must concur, our moral judgment must remain in statu quo; 
the section most open to the charge of inconsistency and 
error, is the very one best calculated, with attention, to pro- 
duce healthy thought and an improved moral perception 
and standard. In this conviction I take leave of “-A.H.K.B.’s” 
essay with feelings of unalloyed satisfaction. The general 
subject, the most important that can engross attention, is, I 
