122 FIRST LOliD DE 8AUMAREZ, ETC. 



thence to Gothenburg whence he convoyed a fleet of 1,000 

 merchant vessels, which had collected there, to the Downs. 



This marks the high-water mark of Napoleon's success. 

 Only in Spam and Portugal was there any active military 

 resistance to his plans. 



Early in 1810 Karl became incapacitated and the ad- 

 herence of Sweden to France was shown by their choice of 

 a new Crown Prince, Bernadotte, Marshall of France, who 

 had been in command of the abortive attack on Sweden from 

 Holstein in 1808. Nevertheless as soon as navigation was 

 possible Saumarez returned to the Baltic. In spite of the 

 change in the situation produced by the fall of Sweden the 

 British fleet still had a great work to do in the Baltic. Per- 

 haps these two years, between the defeat of Sweden and the 

 outbreak of w 7 ar between France and Russia, contain the 

 finest achievement of Saumarez. For during these years, 

 all that the British arms had failed to do in the seizure of 

 the Danish fleet, and in the support which was afforded to 

 Sweden, was won by economic pressure on hostile commerce, 

 by economic undermining of the continental system, and 

 above all by the superb tact and diplomacy of Saumarez. 

 For largely by his skilful exploitation of those events of 

 1 8 10-12 which tended to widen the breach between the sym- 

 pathies and ambitions of France and Russia, and which 

 might be expected to raise the hopes of the party of Liberty 

 in those countries which were groaning under the tyranny of 

 Napoleon, there w T as built up a new order in Europe in which 

 there stood opposed to French aggression in conjunction with 

 England and Spain, that Northern Coalition which ever since 

 1806 it had been the steadfast purpose of the British Govern- 

 ment to establish. 



His work, then, was diplomatic rather than naval. Sur- 

 rounded by nominally hostile countries, yet secure on his 

 own element, the sea, he had to foster in all the Baltic 

 nations those who were for one reason or another favourable 

 to England or disgusted with Napoleon. To effect this he 

 was armed with special diplomatic powers as the general 

 representative of Great Britain in those seas. 



In Sweden particularly there never ceased to exist a 

 strong feeling of sympathy with England. Though she had 

 made peace with France she did not formally declare war 

 on England until June, 1810. Before that time Saumarez 

 made every effort to retain her trade with England at its 

 normal level while at the same time maintaining such a dis- 

 play of naval force as would amply account for Swedish 

 compliance. In the early summer he received Orders in 

 Council extending those of 1807 to Sweden and ordering 



