1922.] FIRST LORD T)B SAtJMAREZ, ETC. 12S 



chandise, and yet avoided committing Sweden to an open 

 break with France. This could only have been disastrous, 

 for the Swedes were traditional enemies of Russia, and in 

 this delicate situation the Russians might well have sup- 

 ported Napoleon in an attack on Sweden. On the other 

 hand, had he acted violently at the first, Sweden might have 

 been forced to join France and undone all his work. This 

 delicate diplomatic situation lasted through the summer, and 

 Saumarez fearing to leave the Baltic till his success was 

 assured, stayed longer than was safe and lost two ships on 

 his return journey. But they were' well compensated for in 

 the success of his work. He had set another year's example 

 of generosity and tact into the scales against the arrogance 

 of Napoleon. 



The British Government realising Saumarez's unrivalled 

 knowledge of the Baltic situation now took the wise pre- 

 caution of submitting all correspondence on that subject to 

 his judgement before any action was taken. 



The winter of 1812 was again critical. Sweden was in 

 an unhappy dilemma. Napoleon as a pledge of her alliance, 

 occupied the island of Rugen and Swedish Pomerania. 

 During the winter and in the previous year Bernadotte had 

 been building up a Swedish army and navy and Napoleon 

 was doubtless suspicious of its purpose. The scale was 

 slightly turned against him by a secret message from the 

 Tsar that he intended to resist the demands of Napoleon in 

 the Milan decrees and that he hoped for the support of 

 England and Sweden. Against this Bernadotte had to set 

 the fact that British financial support would be needed to 

 put his fleet and army into action, and, as he well knew, 

 British finances were not in a flourishing condition. 



In this uncertain condition of affairs the " Victory" with 

 Saumarez in command arrived again off Gothenburg in the 

 early Spring of 18 12. This year his chief purpose was to 

 prevent a French occupation of the Danish islands in the 

 Sound for the purpose of attacking Sweden. To effect this 

 his mere presence was sufficient. At the same time the Danes 

 were becoming less hostile, and in the Autumn they made 

 peace. Thus the tact of Saumarez removed the bitterness 

 caused by the Copenhagen expeditions of 1801 and 1807 and 

 destroyed the hostility of the Danes as it had won the 

 friendship of the Swedes. 



But the central interest of the year was the conversion 

 of the great Russian empire into an active enemy of 

 Napoleon. Britain had kept the seas for five years waiting 

 for a military ally who should enable her to complete on 

 land the great work which she had begun at sea. Now at last 



