In its experiences in collective bargaining, labor has often used the 

 "strike" as an effective weapon to increase its bargaining power. The 

 nature of the agricultural industry does not lend itself as readily to 

 a strike situation.-. The high percentage of fixed costs, biological 

 nature of the industry, few alternative uses for land, and the like are 

 all well known factors which affect the ability of agriculture to adjust 

 to price changes or to make a strike effective. Under certain situa- 

 tions, however, this weapon can be. used by farmers to gain bargaining 

 advantafresa There are examples of successful farmerfe strikes in the 

 milk industry. In certain areas canning crop growers have also been 

 successful in improving their bargaining position by shifting and 

 threatening to shift their land to production - of other crops© 



The effectiveness of such strike attempts depends upon how effective 

 the association is and how much control it has over production, In the 

 case of canning tomatoes, it is obvious that the threat to strike, or 

 more properly stated, the threat not to grow tomatoes, must be made prior 

 to the planting season. Once the crop is planted the farmer has incurred 

 certain costs that cannot be recovered unless he continues the production 

 process and markets his crop. The threat not to plant tomatoes can, of 

 course , be more effective in influencing terms of the contract if the farmers 

 have several alternative uses for their land, labor and other resources,, 

 The fewer the alternatives the less effective the bargaining power. 



By centering attention upon the key importance of the threatened strike 



it is easier to examine the bargaining process by which the final negotiated 



price is arrived at. 



When a cooperative demands an increase or resists a reduction in the price 

 by threatening to withhold the desired acreage, the processor buyer must 

 either pay a higher orice than he would have paid of his own initiative or 

 must be prepared to endure the direct loss resulting from a stoppage or a 

 severe reduction in his supply. If resistance appears less costly than 

 concession he will resist; if concession seems cheaper, he will meet the 

 cooperative's demands'. These are the two over-all alternatives. What 

 are the circumstances that determine which one will be accepted? 



Nicholls analyzes the bargaining process in the milk industry in which 



producer cooperatives use strike threats to force milk distributors 



to raise prices above those oaid in the absence of a bargaining agency. 



As the expected length of the strike increases the price which distributors 



are willing to pay rises, and at the same time the nrice which producers are 



willing to accent decreases. When the length of time the two parties are 



willing to strike are equal at a single price then they will come to agreement, 



With some modifications due to the differences in production and marketing 

 methods, Nicholls' analysis of milk .bargaining may be applied to the canning 

 crop industries. One difference to keep in mind is that milk producers can 

 shut off the supply of their product on a day to day basis, whereas the 

 canning cron producers have to decide whether to produce or not to produce for 

 an entire season. However, the element of time can be used quantitatively 

 in the canning crop bargaining association just as in milk bargaining 



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