WARFARE OF ANTIQUITY. 29 



line, the infantry in the centre, the turmcn of cavalry on the flanks at A A. 

 By the second mode (jig. 47), the left wing, with i^ts cavalry A, preserves 

 such a distance from the right wing of the enemy as to be out of reach of 

 his projectiles, while the right wing, with its cavalry A, advances in echelon 

 from the right and strives to drive him back or outflank him. The third 

 method is in all respects like the second, save that the attack is directed 

 against the left wing of the foe. The fourth mode {fig. 48 d) was thus : 

 the direct order of battle was maintained until within 150 paces of the 

 enemy ; then the centre halted, and both wings advanced rapidly upon the 

 foe to overthrow his flanks. As an example of the fourth and fifth methods, 

 the action at Elinga, between Scipio and Hasdrubal, may be given {fig. 50). 

 On the day of the fight, Scipio beat up the advanced posts of the Cartha- 

 ginians with his cavalry and light troops, while he placed his army in order 

 of battle, thus : the auxiliaries in the centre A, but the Roman legions 

 forming the wings B B, so that they were opposite Hasdrubal's Spanish 

 auxiliaries, who were on the flanks of his direct line of battle C. After the 

 light troops had fought for some time with tolerable success, Scipio caused 

 them to retire through the intervals of the maniples and to take post behind 

 the wings, the light troops in the first line, the cavalry in the second, and he 

 then advanced upon the foe. When the army was yet about a stadium 

 (125 paces) distant from the line of the enemy, the centre was ordered to 

 step short, while Scipio with the right wing and J. Silanus with the left 

 advanced in echelon by the centre from the flanks of each wing, upon the 

 two extremities of the hostile line, the cavalry at the same time advancing 

 from the cover of the flanks B B and attacking the cavalry of Hasdrubal D D. 

 Both flanks of Hasdrubal's line were broken, and his army would have been 

 destroyed had not a violent storm of wind and rain forced both armies back 

 to their camps. 



The sixth mode of attack is nearly related to the second, yet the explana- 

 tion of it by Vegetius is so obscure that it permits two different representa- 

 tions. According to the first (/>/. ^^fig- 48 h) the army advances in the direct 

 order, and at the distance of a stadium (125 paces) from the foe is halted, 

 when the right wing attacks the hostile left in the second method, while the 

 centre and left wing retire in echelon from the right, until the whole army 

 forms an oblique line to the enemy, while the reserve at A forms a square. 

 The explanation which Vegetius adds in this case, however, that the army is 

 brought thereby into the form of an I, has caused the second representation 

 {fig. 49, right). By this the whole army advances in column of maniples 

 upon the left flank of the enemy, the cavalry A draws out to the right 

 against the hostile cavalry, and the maniples then face to the left and march 

 until they have formed the echelon A A, when they face again to the front 

 and advance in this oblique formation upon the foe, as shown at B B, in 

 order thus to roll him up. 



The seventh mode of attack is either of the preceding modes when one 

 flank is supported upon a fixed point, as a hill, a river, or the like. An 

 eighth mode was that which determined the battle of Cannae, where Hanni- 

 bal attacked with the centre and threw back his flanks. The Romans had 



505 



