quately. In this light, the current outcry over 

 management action and inaction begins to 

 take on new and added significance. Second, 

 there may be major discrepancies between the 

 agency's budget requests (again in relative 

 terms) and the congressional appropriations. 

 To the extent that appropriations differ from 

 requests, emphasis is shifted among resources, 

 activities, and functions. If this is happening, 

 then remedial action by an aggrieved public is 

 clearly indicated. Lobbying could force a re- 

 alignment of congressional appropriations. 

 Third, it may be that the agency budget re- 

 quests do not realistically reflect legislated 

 goals. 



The importance of the issue raised in this 

 discussion can hardly be overestimated. It is 

 the question of who best knows what is in the 

 public interest. Some would argue that if the 

 Forest Service is capable of carrying out the 

 mandate of the FOREST model by generating 

 the necessary information and calculations, 

 then it ought to be able to determine where, 

 how, and when money is to be spent in per- 

 forming its program-implementing activities. 

 This argument maintains that because the 

 agency is dealing with complex biosystems, 

 the general public cannot be expected to 

 understand all that is required to make a com- 

 petent determination of what should be done. 

 In short, the prescription is to get the budget 

 requests in line with the overriding decision 

 model (assuming it is properly implemented) 

 and all will be well. 



There are several reasons to suspect that 

 current budget requests do not clearly reflect 

 legislative goals. First, the agency has not to 

 date shown a complete goal orientation and, 

 therefore, it is unlikely that requests represent 

 funding of optimal programs. Second, and 

 more important in its practical thrust, is the 

 familiar political and bureaucratic nature of 

 the budgetmaking process in virtually all gov- 

 ernment agencies. Initial budget requests are 

 submitted IV2-2 years in advance of the fiscal 

 year covered. Although some will deny that 

 the agency tends to let past appropriations 

 affect current requests, the tendency pervades 

 most bureaucratic budgeting processes, and 

 the Forest Service is unlikely to escape it. 71 



71 Haveman (1970), p. 89-97; Lowi (1969), passim. 



If, time after time in the past, the agency has 

 seen its requests for timber sales administra- 

 tion, for example, fully funded, while at the 

 same time other parts of its request were pared 

 down, there will be a strong incentive to in- 

 flate the timber budget (with a strong proba- 

 bility of getting it through), while at the same 

 time neglecting other budget items to some 

 extent. 



An agency officer may know that any re- 

 quests for either soil and watershed funds or 

 research funds outside of the States repre- 

 sented by the subcommittee members will in 

 all probability be reduced. If he has similar as- 

 surance that if he does not ask for range man- 

 agement funds he will simply "lose" that 

 much of the total budget, he is likely to in- 

 flate the range figure. Year-to-year budget re- 

 quests may tend to be reduced, when neces- 

 sary, in areas seen as likely to be lost or not 

 fully funded. Although recognition of this 

 fact may cause consternation, the practice is 

 so familiar in bureaucratic situations that the 

 burden of proof is placed on the agency that 

 claims to be free of it. The general rule is that 

 the agency request represents what it can get 

 rather than what it needs. 



Analysis of data in the Appendix indicates 

 that Forest Service requests may have been 

 made on just such a basis. Changes obviously 

 occur as agency budget requests are passed 

 along on their way to the final appropriation. 

 Many of these changes are due to the agency's 

 inability to demonstrate adequately the full 

 range and consequences of management al- 

 ternatives. This, in turn, makes it difficult to 

 argue convincingly for program redirection. 

 This process began long ago. Once it began, it 

 was very difficult to reverse, and changes in 

 program directions came very slowly. This 

 may explain in part why the MU-SY Act has 

 been so slow in achieving significant changes. 



Congress and Priorities 



If an agency's budget request is influenced 

 to some extent by what it can get, the ques- 

 tion remains whether what it can get truly 

 serves the public interest. Perhaps the Con- 

 gress, being the center of the public arena, 

 has a better "feel" for what the public wants 

 and needs. Thus, we may note that during the 



56 



