example, McCurdy and Miller (1968) found that a majority of visitors to a National 

 Wildlife Refuge favored user-fees if the revenues were returned to that refuge for main- 

 tenance and facility development. Under current Federal regulations, entrance fees 

 cannot be used in this manner (they are returned to the U.S. Treasury). If such ear- 

 marking of funds were permitted, support of pricing as a rationing technique might grow. 



A second concern about pricing is that a fee, if high enough, would unduly dis- 

 criminate against the poor. The concern about discriminating against the poor is, in 

 a sense, paradoxical. Wilderness is often said to be available only to the well-to-do 

 because of the high costs thought to be associated with its use. However, studies of 

 wilderness users suggest that per-person, per-day expenditures are generally quite low 

 (Stankey 1971; footnote 2). 



The income distribution of wilderness users generally resembles that of the popula- 

 tion as a whole. For instance, in a study of users to seven areas in Montana, the 

 income distribution of users was found to be virtually identical to that of the national 

 population (footnote 2) . However, there is also evidence of a bimodal distribution of 

 users according to occupation, with about one-third in professional-technical occupa- 

 tions and another one-fourth students. In the above mentioned study, about 25 percent 

 of the users reported incomes under $7,000. 



In a recent paper, Vaux (1975) reports that with the exception of students, he 

 found a disproportionately small number of low-income people in four randomly sampled 

 wildernesses in California. And, he argues,, students tend to understate their income, 

 reporting their own earned income rather than that of their parents. In his study, 

 57 percent of the users reported incomes in excess of $10,000 as opposed to 41 percent 

 of the State population and 37 percent for the Nation. 



Krutilla and Knetsch (1970) have argued that because of the generally high income 

 distribution of wilderness users, the normal concern with "distributive justice" is 

 less appropriate. Thus, pricing represents a reasonably equitable mechanism for estab- 

 lishing an equilibrium between supply and demand. However, as we have seen, the actual 

 distribution of income groups appears to be fairly wide; low-income groups are repre- 

 sented to a significant degree and we must be concerned with the possible discriminatory 

 implications of a rationing system based solely on pricing. 



Beyond the discriminatory shortcomings of pricing, an additional problem concerns 

 the extent to which price could be used to "fine tune" demand. In other words, as the 

 level of use approaches an area's capacity, could a gradual increase in prices keep 

 demand below capacity? (This issue is based upon two assumptions: (1) that we possess 

 accurate knowledge of an area's capacity and can regulate use through other means, and 



(2) that we understand the relationship between the demand for wilderness at the various 

 price levels that might be assigned.) The three systems discussed earlier all permit 

 exact regulation of use; pricing is a manipulative, rather than a direct control device 



(Gilbert and others 1972). 



There appears to be substantial resistance to the rationing of wilderness through 

 pricing. About one-half of the visitors in an earlier study opposed the imposition of 

 a fee; however, one-quarter favored such a move (Stankey 1973). Although Americans 

 accept market allocations in most areas, there is a strong cultural notion affirming 

 that the opportunity to experience nature should be "free" to the user. This, of course ; 

 is not to imply that because the experience has no "cost," it is valueless. 



An increasing proportion of choice private lands have hunting rights allocated by 

 pricing mechanisms. Participation in many other recreational activities is regulated 

 by price. Perhaps after more exposure to this system, together with the fading of the 

 initial shock associated with the suggestion of pricing wilderness, resistance will 

 decline. 



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