degree, the opportunity cost of time is a function of wages per unit of time; thus, 

 this system, in effect, constitutes a progressive tax on the use of facilities (as 

 income rises, and thus the opportunity cost of time, so does the cost [tax] of using 

 the facility) . 



As long as there is competition for the use of the recreational resource base, 

 say for logging or mining, capacity cannot be expanded indefinitely. Further it would 

 be difficult even for Disney to duplicate the vast reaches of, say, the 1.2 million 

 acre Selway-Bitterroot Wilderness. Hence, at zero money price in a situation where 

 demand exceeds supply, the queue filters out users for whom time has a high opportunity 

 cost relative to the value they place on a wilderness experience. Therefore, under 

 queuing, goods supplied publicly at congested facilities are not "public goods" in the 

 Samuelson sense, but goods whose price is a function of the opportunity costs of time 

 rather than money. 



Because queuing would benefit persons with abundant leisure time (or low opportu- 

 nity cost for their time), groups such as students (currently, a major use group) would 

 be favored, while those with little leisure time (a high opportunity cost for time) such 

 as professional -technical people, another major use group, would be penalized. It would 

 also favor local users over those from more distant locations because "locals" would 

 face smaller risks of lost time and money from being turned away. 



A queuing system could impose substantial administrative costs. Because many people 

 will choose to "wait in line," services and facilities will need to be provided, in- 

 cluding camping areas, garbage collection, and sanitary facilities. Some State Park 

 and National Park campgrounds have waiting or overflow areas. Such areas can be an 

 administrative headache. 



Queuing as a method for rationing wilderness use does not appear to have a great 

 deal of support. In the study of attitudes about control, only 28 percent favored a 

 first-come, first-served system, while 57 percent opposed it (Stankey 1973). It might 

 be that the high degree of uncertainty associated with such a system ("Will we be able 

 to get a permit after traveling all this way?" or "How long will we have to wait?") is 

 responsible for the relatively low level of support. 



Rationing by Price 



The President's Advisory Panel on Timber and the Environment (1973) has recommended 

 that charges be levied for wilderness use, as a means of holding use within the carrying 

 capacity of these areas. Regulating demand through pricing is, of course, one of the 

 most common forms of rationing in our society today. When the idea is applied to 

 wilderness, however there is considerable resistance. Two basic reasons appear to 

 underlie these objections. 



First, people object to paying for what has always been free, or for what appears 

 to have been free. However, when use exceeds capacity, costs are unavoidable. The 

 choice is not whether to pay, but how. Society can choose to "pay" through the dim- 

 inished quality of the wilderness resource and the experiences it produces, or it can 

 "pay" by selective exclusion from rights to access. Rationing systems are systems for 

 selection, and pricing selects against those unable or unwilling to pay. Preferably, 

 the rationing system would filter those unwilling to pay because they do not place a 

 high relative value on wilderness. 



Moreover, we do have precedents for public reaction to the pricing of a tradi- 

 tionally free resource. Participation in hunting as well as many forms of outdoor 

 recreation (e.g., car camping) is now charged for and this is accepted by most people. 

 Occasionally, the costs are high; nonresident fees for hunting exceed $100 many places. 

 What might be critical for obtaining public support is the understanding that the money 

 spent to gain access is used to protect and manage that particular location. For 



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