is almost twice the number of persons in the area on July 22, only about 2 weeks earlier. 

 A random selection mechanism would function most smoothly if information were provided 

 as to the probabilities of success as a function of time. If, for example, people were 

 advised that on the basis of previous years' experience, the probability (chance) of 

 obtaining a permit was 1 in 5 for the 4th of June, 1 in 10 for the 4th of July, and 1 

 in 2 for the 4th of October, people might be expected to weigh the relative advantages 

 of visiting at a specified time against the probability of gaining admission. From 

 this information, then, one would apply for the dates that would maximize the chances 

 of success. If this information were provided, we might expect more even use levels 

 over the season. 



A similar system could be used to even out 



areas. In areas where capacity has always been 



of gaining entry would be less than it would be 

 narily underutilized. 



use spatially, either within or between 

 fully used in the past, the probability 

 for areas where the capacity was ordi- 



A lottery could be extremely cumbersome to administer. For example, a lottery 

 might issue permits for individuals, for groups, or for time. Lotteries that issued 

 permits to individuals would be unpalatable to most visitors because almost all use is 

 in groups. Similarly, lotteries that issued permits to groups would need to account 

 for the variation in group size, so that excessive numbers of individuals did not gain 

 entry. Finally, lotteries that issued permits for time would need to reconcile varying 

 trip lengths in order to prevent use from exceeding an area's capacity. 



Although lotteries have been used successfully to distribute permits for big-game 

 hunting, the conditions are different for allocating wilderness-use permits. Duration 

 of big-game seasons is clearly specified in advance, and usually a permit holder may 

 hunt at any time he wishes during that season. To hold use in line with capacity, a 

 wilderness lottery would need to specify when a visit was to occur as well as where. 



Wilderness users apparently oppose a lottery as a means of allocating permits to 

 visit wildernesses. Only 18 percent favored a lottery; 62 percent opposed it (Stankey 

 1973). Many people appear reluctant to leave to chance the opportunity for a wilderness 

 permit. However, because a lottery to allocate wilderness permits is not in use at 

 present, visitor unfamil iarity with the system might contribute to the low level of 

 support . 



Rationing by Queuing 



Filtering demand through a queue (first-come, first-served or "wait your turn in 

 line" without any provision for advance reservations) is a complex and often misunder- 

 stood system of rationing. Queuing actually imposes a price in terms of time. Time 

 pricing has been suggested as preferable to monetary pricing because time is more 

 equally distributed than money (Smolensky 1972). However, available leisure time is 

 not evenly distributed; rather it probably is a U-shaped relationship, relatively 

 more available during youth and old age. Conversely, because leisure time is relatively 

 abundant, its value or opportunity cost is low. While wilderness users are spread across 

 a wide age range, most are found in the 20- to 45-year-old range (footnote 2), where 

 the opportunity costs of time are generally high because of job obligations, income, 

 family responsibilities, etc. 



Because time is a price, some of the disadvantages noted for reservation and 

 lottery systems are eliminated; notably the lack of a market that discriminates on the 

 basis of willingness to pay. But queuing also has problems. For example, although the 

 person obtaining the goods or service pays for it in time, no one receives the benefit 

 of the price. When we give up money, our loss is someone else's gain; when we give up 

 time, it is not available to anyone else but is lost forever. Also, this system dis- 

 criminates against those for whom time has a high opportunity cost. To a considerable 



8 



