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SCIENCE. 



[N. S. Vol. XXI. No. 542. 



diietive sociology;* and still later Brinton 

 (1837-1899) made noteworthy advances 

 toward classifying the Amerinds {i. e., the 

 native tribes) by their own crude philos- 

 ophies, thus forecasting an inductive sci- 

 ence now called sophiology. These ad- 

 vances seem simple and easy in the light 

 of present knowledge, and may look small 

 to present backsight; yet in originality of 

 work and boldness of conception they rank 

 with the advances of Linne and Lavoisier — 

 and be it remembered that they were not 

 borrowed in any part, but bought at cost 

 of the sweat and blood of often tragic ex- 

 perience. The unprecedented practicalness 

 of American anthropology is attested by 

 the fact that while Morgan and Brinton 

 still wrought (in 1879) a governmental 

 bureau was created to continue the classi- 

 fication of the native tribes; and its direc- 

 tion was entrusted to Powell, a master able 

 not merely to occupy, but greatly to extend, 

 the foundation laid by Gallatin. Under 

 this impetus the new science progressed 

 apace; American students multiplied; ob- 

 servations spread afar; each discovery pre- 

 pared the way for others, and the new prin- 

 ciples opened to scientific view the entire 

 field of the humanities— that field afore- 

 time claimed on one side by scholastic and 

 statist, and held on the other by devotees 

 of poesy and romance. The growing knowl- 

 edge bridged the seas and the Powellian 

 product blent with that of Tylor (both 

 profiting by the experience of British 

 India), and pushed on to several conti- 

 nental centers during the last two decades 

 of the nineteenth century. 



Toward the close of the old century, 

 what may be called the kinetic and collect- 

 ive characters of humanity were brought 

 out clearly and the American aborigines 



* The speculative sociology of Auguste Comte 

 (1703-18.57) and the semi-speculative system of 

 Herbert Spencer are to be noted merely as stand- 

 ing on somewhat distinct bases. 



(with other peoples as Avell) were defined 

 by the activities, i. e., by what they do, and 

 this collectively — for in the realm of hu- 

 manity no one lives to himself alone, but 

 all are joined in twos and larger groups. 

 Now it can not be too strongly emphasized 

 that the basis of this definition differs fun- 

 damentally and absolutely from that of any 

 other science ; for all other entities — stars 

 and planets, molecules and ions, minerals 

 and rocks, plants and animals — are defined 

 by what they are (perhaps measurably by 

 the way in which they respond to external 

 forces), while the humans are defined and 

 classed by what they do spontaneously and 

 voluntarily as self-moving and self-moved 

 units or groups. Necessarily this view of 

 humanity awakens inquiry as to why the 

 human entity stands in a distinct class 

 among the objects of nature; yet this is 

 hardly a present problem, since the makers 

 of modern anthropology find full answer 

 in that unique nature-power lying behind 

 the kinetic character of unit or group, viz., 

 mentality. So in the last analysis the 

 modem definitions of mankind are pri- 

 marily psychic; and it matters 'little 

 whether men are classed by what they do 

 or by what they thinTc, save that doing is 

 humanity's largest heritage from loAver an- 

 cestry and hence precedes thinking — the 

 essential point is that the practically scien- 

 tific classification of mankind must rest on 

 a kinetic basis, i. e., on self-developed and 

 self -regulated conduct. 



Of late the activities themselves are 

 grouped as arts, industries, laws, languages 

 and philosophies, and each group consti- 

 tutes the object-matter of a sub-science, 

 thus giving form to esthetology, technology, 

 sociology, philology and sophiology; and 

 these (together called demonomy, or prin- 

 ciples of peoples), with somatology and 

 psychology, make up the field of fin-de- 

 siecle anthropology — the last two corre- 

 sponding, respectively, with the phj'sical 



