Prince Bismarck and his Policy. 



91 



reign to a Roman bishop, who was only the head of the 

 Catholic church, and whose power from henceforth rested 

 merely in the faith of the Catholic nations. 



IsTapoleon, without knowing it, had raised the German 

 unity question, whose deadly enemy he was. 



Magenta and Solferino were the first building stones of 

 German unity. 



That ITapoleon had some undefined suspicion of his 

 blunder may be inferred from the fact, that he left a 

 French army at the disposal of the Roman curia. He 

 kept the new kingdom in a state of dependence, and 

 was always ready to march with an army and correct the 

 work of his own hands. 



On April 1, 1859, Bismarck was recalled from Frank- 

 fort and sent to Petersburg as embassador. 



The observations of his Frankfort experiences were ex- 

 pressed in the following conclusions : " All measures at 

 the Diet are carried by Austria and its smaller states to the 

 manifest disadvantage of Prussia. The curtailing of Prus- 

 sia's power seems to be the magnetic needle of all their 

 actions." 



ITapoleon III. descended to the plains of Lombardy : 

 Austria was vanquished at Magenta and Solferino, and 

 Russia could enjoy its first revenge on the ungrateful 

 Hapsburg, who had betrayed it before Sebastopol. 



The declaration of peace at Villa-franca made ^N'apoleon 

 the political pontifex of Europe, and Prussia was the next 

 power on whom Austria's fate was to be repeated. 



To meet the emergency, which seemed to every clear- 

 sighted statesman inevitable, the reorganization of the army 

 was at last decreed (merely decreed) on July 4, 1861. 



Prussia's direct gain by the Franco-Austrian war was, 

 an estrangement of some of the smaller German states from 

 Austria and a firmer attitude of Prussia in the Diet, 



