No. 495] NOTES AND LITERATURE 211 



"strictly scientific," but one wishes that the author might give 

 us an imaginative picture of what life and the universe may be 

 in the consciousness of this little creature, that does not hear, 

 sees little or nothing of colors, can't distinguish a square box 

 from a round one nor a circular card from a triangular one, 

 feels impelled to "cut figure eights and spin like a top" on its 

 way to a dish of food, and learns many things rapidly and 

 well. Possibly such an unscientific picture could be appended 

 to the really scientific account without injury to the latter! 

 Dr. Yerkes is still studying the dancing mouse, and may some 

 time feel prepared to give us such a picture. 



Or perhaps we must look for such pictures to the second 

 volume of the Animal Behavior Series, of which this is the 

 first! The second one, just announced, is a volume on "The 

 Animal Mind," by Margaret Washburn. The Series, edited 

 by Dr. Yerkes, promises to be of the greatest value. 



A matter that has been most in need of study is the part 

 played by imitation in the behavior of higher animals. Years 

 ago imitation was the favorite refuge of those who wished to 

 explain the remarkable actions of animals without attributing 

 to them higher intellectual powers. When Tabby pressed the 

 latch and walked out the door, that was because she had seen 

 some one do it. Then came Thorndike, and changed all that. 

 To give imitation in place of reason as an explanation, says 

 Thorndike, is to substitute one false explanation for another. 

 In studying cats, and monkeys, Thorndike saw no signs of imita- 

 tion either of one another or of man. And most later investiga- 

 tors have agreed that imitation plays little part in the behavior 

 of animals, at least in comparison with what had been supposed. 

 Even the monkey, we are told, rarely imitates man or other 

 monkeys. Direct, unreflective imitation of simple sounds or 

 movements — the performance of an act merely because a com- 

 panion has performed it, without reference to results — is less 

 rare, though likewise not so common, as had been supposed. But 

 the imitation of an act because that act accomplished a certain 

 result, and in order to accomplish the same result — this was 

 not found, though this is the kind of imitation assumed in cur- 

 rent explanations to be common. The extensive experiments of 

 Hobhouse, 2 evidently undertaken with the expectation of find- 

 ing imitation playing a part, are striking as an example of how 

 3 Mind in Evolution, Chapter VIII. 



