No. 503] 



NOTES AXD LET EH A TV TIE 



759 



physico-chemical ones. But this has no bearing on the answer 

 to the first question: it is no argument against the existence of 

 mind in either man or animals, for it does exist in man. It 

 may therefore exist in animals: the author concludes, as he is 

 bound to, that the probability is that men and animals are alike 

 in this matter: that animals also are conscious. His only con- 

 tention is that mind is not a factor in determining: objective be- 

 havior; or as the reviewer would prefer to put it, that a com- 

 plete objective explanation of behavior can be given without 

 taking into consideration consciousness. 



Zur Strassen's discussion brings out two points that much 

 need recognition. (1) If we adopt the principle of parsimony 

 of explanation as a test for the existenct of psychic qualities, 

 as has been done by various authors, we inevitably come to the 

 result that such qualities do not exist, even in places where 

 we know, by direct experience, that they do exist. When I 

 withdraw my burned linger from the flame, consciousness is 

 no more required for an objective explanation of this action 

 than it is for the withdrawal of Amoeba under similar condi- 

 tions, yet in my case there is consciousness, of a very intense 

 character. Therefore the result of the application of this prin- 

 ciple of parsimony is no test whatever for the existence of 

 psychic qualities. A consistent carrying through of the prin- 

 ciple places man and animals in the same category, and is there- 

 fore, as Zur Strassen maintains, rather favorable than other- 

 wise, to the general distribution of consciousness in animals. 



(2) Admission of the existence of consciousness in animals 

 is not equivalent to holding that consideration of this conscious- 

 ness is required for a complete objective explanation of behavior. 

 This point needs to be sharply realized. Look at the matter ex- 

 perimentally. A complete explanation, from an experimental 

 point of view, is one in which the preceding condition is shown 

 to contain differential factors for determining all the differentia- 

 tions of the succeeding condition. The question whether con- 

 sciousness is a "factor" requiring consideration in objective 

 explanations resolves itself experimentally into this: Do w T e 

 sometimes, in analytical experimentation, come to situations 

 where there are no differences in experimentally perceivable 

 factors to account for differences in our results? If we could 

 perceive accurately all the objective factors present, should we 

 find that sometimes two identical combinations give different 



