BLM 



Figure 72. — Early detection of this small lightning fire will 

 contribute to rapid control. 



description and location of current thunderstorm 

 cells or systems is not yet feasible; and, because 

 of its speed such a plane is often diverted from 

 its primary detection mission to be used for re- 

 connaissance of going fires and for lead plane 

 duties on retardant chemical attacks. The lighter 

 planes which are also used occasionally for pa- 

 trol are dispatched to lead plane duty whenever 

 possible to permit the P-51 to continue its recon- 

 naissance work. 



Recent advances in development of elec- 

 tronic devices may make it possible to provide 

 a reliable system for tracking storms, locating 

 fires, and mapping going fires. Certain types 

 of radar can identify mature thunderstorm cells. 

 Sferics receivers are being developed to further 

 determine whether an electrical disturbance is 

 present (Battan 1959). Airborne infrared map- 

 ping devices are now being investigated for use 

 in the actual locating and mapping of fires 

 (Hirsch 1962). 



SUPPRESSION 



Preparation for an expected bad fire season 

 in Interior Alaska is a tremendous job, but it 

 must be done thoroughly so that the subsequent 

 suppression effort will be adequate. 



Method of Attack 



Fire control tactics in Interior Alaska are 

 similar to those used elsewhere. Log istica I ly, at- 



tack on fires accessible to motor vehicles is rela- 

 tively simple. Initial attack on fires hundreds of 

 miles from the source of supply requires ingenuity 

 and wise use of every facility feasible. Except 

 for longer time and distances involved, the fol- 

 lowing procedure follows closely those used in 

 other States: As soon as a fire is reported, the 

 dispatcher sends chemical retardant planes. At 

 the same time he dispatches smokejumpers. 

 Then, ground forces are sent to reinforce and re- 

 lieve jumpers. Their travel may be by land plane 

 to a small field, thence by amphibious plane to 

 a body of water near the fire, and possibly by 

 helicopter to the fireline. Subsequent loads of 

 chemicals for tactical support are often ordered 

 when conditions indicate the need. 



As an example of the effectiveness of this 

 type of rapid attack, some 1959 statistics follow: 

 Of all fires upon which retardant was dropped, 

 35 percent was within 50 miles of the base, 43 

 percent between 50 and 100 miles, and 22 per- 

 cent between 100 and 200 miles; an average of 

 seven loads was dropped on each fire by planes 

 traveling a mean one-way distance of 85 miles. 

 The application of chemical checked the fires' 

 spread to an extent that firefighters controlled 85 

 percent of them at the same size class as when 

 the retardant was applied. 



Smokejumpers in 1959 traveled as far as 

 472 miles to reach fires, but the average distance 

 was 250 miles. Jumpers controlled 36 fires with 

 an average force of five men per fire, and con- 

 trolled 94 percent of them within the same size 

 class as when attacked. 



Distance Traveled to Fires 



Analysis of individual fire reports showed 

 only the following general relationships between 

 distance traveled according to final fire size, and 

 whether action was taken: Fifty-six percent of all 

 reported fires occurred within 100 miles of head- 

 quarters. Sixty percent of action fires occurred 

 within 100 miles compared to only 20 percent of 

 those on which no action was taken. Only 12 

 percent of action fires occurred at distances 

 greater than 200 miles compared with 39 per- 

 cent for no-action fires. One-third of the fires 

 larger than 300 acres are farther than 200 miles 

 away from headquarters. More than two-thirds 

 are farther than 100 miles away. This situation 

 will always prevail simply because it takes 



89 



