Reason and Tun tine I. 



6043 



On Reason and Instinct. By the Rev. J. C. Atkinson, M.A. 



In my first paper on "Reason and Instinct" (Zool. 2333) I gave 

 definitions of these two essences or qualities, as follows : " In the first 

 place, as to Reason. ' The perception of truth, as it is in itself, is 

 commonly ascribed to our rational faculties; and these have, by 

 Locke and others, been reduced to two, reason and judgment. The 

 former is said to be conversant about certain truths, the latter chiefly 

 about probabilities.' Dr. Reid says, ' We ascribe to reason two 

 offices or two degrees: the first is, to judge of things self-evident; 

 the second, to draw conclusions that are not self-evident from those 

 that are.' Secondly, as to Instinct. Instinct is a ' certain power or 

 disposition of mind, by which, independent of all instruction or ex- 

 perience, without deliberation and without having any end in view, 

 animals are unerringly directed to do spontaneously whatever is ne- 

 cessary for the preservation of the individual or the continuation of 

 the kind.' ' Instinct,' writes the author of ' Ancient Metaphysics,' 

 * is a determiuation given by Almighty wisdom to the mind of the 

 brute to act in such or such a way, upon such or such an occasion, 

 without intelligence, without a knowledge of good or evil, and with- 

 out knowing for what end or purpose he acts.' One more quotation, 

 which serves, as it were, to bring together and contrast these two sets 

 of definitions, and we will be content. * Actions performed with a 

 view to acconiplish a certain end are called rational actions, and the 

 end in view is the motive to their performance. Instinctive actions 

 have a cause, viz., the internal impulse by which they are sponta- 

 neously performed ; but they cannot be said to have a motive, because 

 they are not done with a view to consequences. Thus a man gives 

 charity in order to relieve a person from want; he fights for his 

 country in order to repel its enemies. Each of these actions is per- 

 formed from a motive, and therefore they are rational actions. An 

 infant is impelled to suck the breast, but he knows not that it is neces- 

 sary for his preservation : it is an action that has no motive, and 

 therefore is not rational; but, as it is performed by a spontaneous 

 exertion of the infant, it is not to be attributed to mere mechanism. 

 It is, therefore, an instinctive action.'" And then, in a note, I add, 

 " The action of breathing is mechanical, being performed without 

 either motive or spontaneous exertion." 



To the definitions here laid down I endeavoured to adhere, and I 

 think not without success, in the paper from which I have extracted 



