6046 



Reason and Instinct. 



individual of the lower orders of animal creation, — to whatever ex- 

 tent they are discernible, whether simply so or to a high degree, — 

 there, and to that extent, 1 believe, and I express my belief, that Reason, 

 be it what it may in man, exists in the brute : and, in like manner, if 

 I can succeed in distinguishing and defining what are the marks of 

 Instinct, the signs and tokens of its presence and operation, without 

 any attempt at a metaphysical determination of what that essence or 

 quality really is, and without running the risk — which I very likely 

 should run if 1 made the attempt — of making words my masters in- 

 stead of my servants, I think I am in a position for carrying on an 

 inquiry which depends, in no very perceptible degree, upon anything 

 but observed phenomena and logical reasoning upon such phe- 

 nomena. 



Before I proceed further, I may as well at once admit the justice 

 of Mr. Tagart's criticism on the expression " Instincts peculiar to 

 man," and on the use of the word Instinct in the plural ; so far, that 

 is, as such use " implies that there are many different kinds of in- 

 stinct." The expression was employed inadvertently, and overlooked 

 in revision. What I meant and what I ought to have said was, " the 

 instincts in which man is a participant; " and it would doubtless have 

 been more correct — and, possibly, more pedantic as well — to have 

 said, all through, " an operation of Instinct" instead of an instinct," 

 and "operations of Instinct" instead of " instincts," however much 

 ordinary use may seem to excuse, or even to require, such want of 

 precision. Perhaps, after this admission, I may be allowed to ask 

 how came Mr. Tagart, who assumes to be " a logician and metaphy- 

 sician," when he flings his stone at ray window and breaks his pane, 

 to forget the vitreous composition of his own domicile so far as to 

 confound "elements" and " operations" ? (Zool. 5742). Surely these 

 are not synonymous or convertible terms ; at least I, who do n't set 

 up as logician and metaphysician, did not use them as such ; on the 

 contrary, I always thought they stood for things, or represented ideas, 

 very essentially distinct and different. Methinks it would sound 

 strange to talk of hydrogen and oxygen as the " operations " of 

 water, or of a thorough good drenching as being the " element" of a 

 sufficiency of that fluid properly applied. I might gratify the love of 

 mischief, which is a sort of " instinct " in so many of us, by another 

 " shy " or two at Mr. Tagart's " house," and chuckle as I heard the 

 smash ensuing ; but I would fain turn to something, less amusing it 

 may be, but at the same time, I would hope, less unprofitable. 



I am quite aware that there is a difficulty in the application of the 



