1920.] 



Inxreasixg Basic Slag Supplies. 



247 



the plough, as in tlie pre-war period, and with the system of 

 farming then current, we would normally grow 5,750,000 

 acres of grain. Should high prices continue to rule, it is 

 probable that 6,250,000 acres would be forthcoming. With 

 15,000,000 acres under the plough, we would grow from 

 7,500,000 acres when corn prices were low to 8,500,000, or 

 even 9,000,000, when prices ruled high (the average for the 

 period 1871-75 was 8,100,000 acres). Should danger arise, it 

 would be impossible to secure 10,000,000 acres of corn in England 

 and Wales, if we started, as in 1914, with no more than 

 11,000,000 acres of tillage land. In spite of the great effort 

 made, we got only 7,500,000 acres in 1918. But if we 

 began with 15,000,000 acres of tillage in hand, our task, 

 though formidable, would be by no means impossible. An 

 extensive grass-ploughing campaign would, no doubt, be called 

 for, but we should start on the effort to secure 2,000,000 or 

 3,000,000 extra acres of corn, with the buildings, the men, 

 the horses, and the machinery which 15,000,000 acres ol tillage 

 would support in time of peace, instead of with the men and 

 equipment of 11,000,000 acres. 



In a war crisis, therefore, these extra 4,000,000 acres of tillage 

 land would mean the difference between the provision of a 

 sufficient, if meagre, supply of breadstuffs for the whole popula- 

 tion, and a curtailment of the supplies that would lead, in the 

 first place, to a breakdown of the machinery for rationing and 

 later to famine and to the popular ferment that would in- 

 evitably seize a people deprived of a sufiiciency of bread. It 

 would mean the dift'erence that there was between our own 

 comfortable, if somewhat unattractive, diet in the last two years 

 of the War, and the makeshifts on which our enemies attempted 

 to fill, but failed to feed, themselves. 



But, it will be argued, " why prepare for another great war 

 when we have made an end of great wars, and why suppose 

 that if there is a war, imports will not reach us with as great 

 certainty as they did between 1914 and 19 18 ? We have shown 

 how to defeat the submarine, and we can safely rely on our 

 Xavy and merchant vessels in any circumstances that may arise/' 

 Let us admit this contention, even if we feel the argument to be 

 unconvincing, and examine the case for the extra 4,000,000 

 acres as a peace proposition. 



On the lavish scale on which this rich nation fed itself and 

 its five stock in the period 1909-13, I estimate that some 

 21,000,000 acres growing " average " {i.e., average British) 

 crops would be wanted to supply the cereals consumed in the 

 United Kingdom. The area under these crops in the United 



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