( 322 ) 



III. 



LECTURE I. 



ON MATERIALISM AND IMMATERIALISM. 



It is one part of science, and not the least important, though the lowest 

 and most elementary, to become duly acquainted with the nature and extent 

 of our ignorance upon whatever subject we propose to investigate ;* and it is 

 probably for want of a proper attention to this branch of study that we meet 

 with so many crude and confident theories upon questions that the utmost 

 wit or wisdom of man is utterly incapable of elucidating. The rude, unin- 

 structed peasant, or ignorant pretender, believes that he understands every 

 thing before him ; the experienced philosopher knows that he understands 

 nothing. It was so formerly in Greece, and will be so in every age and 

 country: while the sophists of Athens asserted their pretensions to universal 

 knowledge, Socrates, in opposition to them, was daily affirming that the only 

 thing he knew to a certainty was his own ignorance. The shallow Indian 

 sage, as soon as he had made the important discovery that the world was sup- 

 ported by an elephant, and the elephant by a tortoise, felt the most perfect 

 complacency in the solution he was now prepared to give to the question, by 

 what means is the world supported in empty space 1 And it is justly observeii 

 by Mr. Barrow, that the chief reason why the Chinese are so far behind Euro- 

 peans in the fine arts and higher branches of science, as painting, for exam- 

 ple, and geometry, is the consummate vanity they possess, which induces 

 them to look with contempt upon the real knowledge of every other nation. 



The subjects we have thus far chiefly discussed, though others branching out 

 from them have been glanced at as well, have related to the principle and pro- 

 perties of matter, both under an unorganized and under an organic modifica- 

 tion: and although I have endeavoured to do my utmost to put you in pos- 

 session of the clearest and most valuable facts which are known upon these 

 subjects, I am much afraid it is to little more than to this first and initial 

 branch of science that any instructions I have given have been able to con- 

 duct you ; for I feel, and have felt deeply as we have proceeded, that they 

 have rather had a tendency to teach us how ignorant we are than how wise ; 

 how little is really known than how much has been actually discovered. And- 

 if this be the case with respect to our course of study thus far pursued, I 

 much suspect that what is to follow has but little chance of giving a higher 

 character to our attainments ; for the subject it proposes to touch upon, the 

 doctrine' of psychology, or the nature and properties of the mind, is the most 

 abstruse and intractable of all subjects that relate to human entity, or the 

 great theatre on which human entity plays its important part ; and, perhaps, 

 so far as relates to the mere discoveries of man himself, remains, excepting 

 in a few points, much the same in the present day as it did two or three thou- 

 sand years ago. 



This subject forms a prominent section of that extensive branch of science 

 which is generally known by the name of Metaphysics, and which, in modern 

 times, has been unjustifiably separated by many philosophers from the divi- 

 sion of Physics, or natural philosophy ; and made a distinct division in itself. 



* " Our knowledge being so narrow, it will perhaps give us" some light into the pres«nt state of our 

 minds if we look a little into the dark side, and take a view of our ignorance, which, being infinitely 

 greater than our knowledge, may serve much to the quieting of disputes and improvement of useful knovr- 

 ledge ; if, discovering how far we have clear and distinct ideas, we confine our thoughts within the coi'i- 

 templation of those things that are within the reach of our understanding ; and launch not out into that 

 abyss of darkness where we have not eyes to see, nor faculties to perceive any thing ; out of a presump- 

 tion that nothing ia beyond our comprehension.— But to be satisfied of the folly of such a conceit we need 

 not go fer."— Locke, Hum. Underst. IV. iii. ^ 22. 



