368 



ON ANCIENT AND MODERN SKEPTICS. 



external world, and yet (putting by the trash of innate ideas) what other ar- 

 guments have we, continues the same school, if school it may be called, for 

 the existence and attributes of a Supreme Being. You may talk of power, 

 but it is a word without a meaning : we can form no idea of power, nor of any 

 being endued with any power, much less of a being endued with infinite power. 

 And we can never have reason to believe that any object or quality of an object 

 exists of which we cannot form an idea. It is, indeed, unreasonable to believe 

 God to be infinitely wise and good while there is any evil or disorder in the uni- 

 verse ; nor have we any sound reason to believe that the world, whatever it 

 may be, proceeds from him, or from any cause whatever. We can never 

 fairly denominate any thing a cause till we have repeatedly seen it produce 

 like effects ; but the universe is an effect quite singular and unparalleled ; and 

 hence it is impossible for us to know any thing of its cause ; it is impossible 

 for us to know that there is any universe whatever; any creature or any Cre- 

 ator ; or any thing in existence but impressions and ideas.* 



It is not my intention to enter into these arguments, nor is it necessary. 

 For though there had been ten times more force or more folly in them than 

 there is, we have already traced the Babel-building to its foundation, and know 

 that it rests upon emptiness. 



Scotland has the disgrace of having given birth to this hydra of absurdity 

 and malignity : she has also the honour of having produced the Hercules by 

 whom it has been strangled. She has, indeed, amply atoned : for she has 

 produced a Hercules in almost every one of her universities. True to the 

 high charge reposed in them, the public guardians of her morals have started 

 forth from Edinburgh, Glasgow, and Aberdeen, armed in celestial panoply, and 

 equally masters of their weapons. Neither argument nor raillery have been 

 spared on the occasion ; and instead of invidiously inquiring whether Reid, 

 Beattie, or Stewart be chiefly entitled to the honours of the victory, let us 

 vote them our thanks in the aggregate. The only regret (and it is incident 

 to human affairs that in almost every victory there should be a regret) is that 

 in pulling down one hypothesis they should have thought it requisite to build 

 up another, and to give a proof of their own weakness in the midst of their 

 own triumph. But this is a subject which must be reserved for our next lec- 

 ture. I cannot, however, consent to quit our present connexion with Mr. 

 Hume, without adverting to Dr. Beattie's very witty, and I may say, for the 

 most part, logical pleasantry upon the leading principle of Mr. Hume's hy- 

 pothesis, that our impressions and ideas of things only differ in degrees of 

 strength ; the idea being an exact copy of the impression, but only accom- 

 panied with a weaker perception. Upon this proposition Dr. Beattie remarks 

 as follows :t " When 1 sit by the fire, I have an impression of heat, and I can 

 form an idea of heat when I am shivering with cold ; in the one case 1 have 

 a stronger perception of heat, in the other a weaker. Is there any warmth 

 in this idea of heat ] There must, according to this doctrine : only the warmth 

 of the idea is not quite so strong as that of the impression. For this author 

 repeats it again and again, that ' an idea is by its nature weaker and fainter 

 than an impression, but is in every other respect' (not only similar but) ' the 

 same.'! Nay, he goes farther, and says, that ' whatever is true of the one 



* Mr. Hume seems to have been only a specuhiti ve advocate of his own doctrines: the Bishop of Cloyne, 

 like tiie Greek skeptics to whom we have formerly adverted, was a real believer. And it is not a little 

 singular that tlie fundamental atheism on which the doctrines of Boodliism are founded, as professed 

 throughout the Burman em[)ire, has fiiven rise, even in the present day, to a sect of philosophical skeptics 

 of the very same kind ; of whicii Mr. Judson, the intelligent American niiissionary to whom I have 

 already alluded (Ser. iii. Lect. iii.), gives us, in his Journal, the following notable example : — " May 20th, 

 1821. Encountered another new character, one Moung liong, from the neighbourhood of Shway-doung, 

 a disciple of the great Tongdwan teacher, the acknowledged h<ja.<\ of all the semi atheists in the country. 

 Like the rest of the sect, Moung Long is, in roalily, a complete skeptic, scarcely believing his 

 own existence. They say he is always quarrelling with liis wile on some metaphysical point. For 

 instance, if she says, " The rice is ready," he will reply, " Rice ! W^iiat is rice? Is it matter or spirit ? la 

 it an idea, or is it a nonentity V Perhaps she will say, " It is matter:" and he will reply, " Well, wife, 

 and what is matter 1 Are you sure there is any such thing in existence, or are you merely subject to a de- 

 lusion of the senses'?"— Account of the American Baptist Missioa to the Burman Empire, &;c. by A. fl. 

 Judson, p. 304, 8vo. Lond. 1823. 



t Beattie on Truth, part. ii. ch. ii. % Treatise on Human Nature, vol. i. p. 131- 



